Market reaction to announcement of enforcement actions against
related party transaction: Evidence from Chinese listed companies by Ren, Jie
Market Reaction to Announcement of Enforcement
Actions against Related Party Transaction
Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
Accounting
Master's thesis
Jie Ren
2015
Department of Accounting
Aalto University
School of Business
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
  
 
 
 
 
Market Reaction to Announcement 
of Enforcement Actions against 
Related Party Transaction 
 
Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies  
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Jie Ren 
Spring 2015 
Accounting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved in the Department of Accounting  __ / __20___ and  awarded the grade 
 _______________________________________________________   
 Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
Author  Jie Ren 
Title of thesis  Market Reaction to the Announcement of Enforcement Actions against              
Related Party Transaction: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies 
Degree  Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration 
Degree programme  Master’s Programme in Accounting 
Thesis advisor(s)  Dr. Yaping Mao  
Year of approval
  
2015 Number of pages  87 Language  English 
Abstract 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate (1) whether the enforcement actions (EAs) 
against related party transaction (RPT) have a negative effect on the market reaction around an-
nouncement period, and (2) what specific factors affect the market reaction. The conjecture is 
driven by the agency theory regarding the opportunistic behavior via RPT. The result of the first 
research question is benchmarked against the market reaction for the public announcements 
(PAs) of RPT. The second question focuses on examining two specific factors that influence the 
announcement effect of RPT EAs, namely, the announcement type and the transaction type. The 
announcement type concerns whether the rectification action could reduce the negative an-
nouncement effect of EAs. The transaction type concerns whether the non-operating RPT yields 
significant announcement effect than other types do. Additionally, the market reaction for the cor-
porate governance mechanism is discussed. It is hypothesized that the market would impose a 
governance discount to firms engaged in RPT. 
Initially 84 target firms that undertook RPT between fiscal year 2000 and 2013 are selected from 
EAs released from January 2008 to July 2014. The matched-pair analysis is adopted for matching  
firms with RPT EAs to the same number of matched-pair firms with RPT PAs on one-to-one basis. 
Therefore, the total sample of the thesis consists of 168 Chinese publicly traded firms. The event 
study methodology is employed to calculate the announcement effect which is measured by the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Quantitative methods are applied to explore the changes of 
CARs in response to the different factors. 
The main conclusion is that the RPT EAs have a significant and negative impact on the stock re-
turns of the target firm around announcement date. And the RPT PAs have a significant and posi-
tive announcement effect. Moreover, EAs that include the rectification actions have a weakly nega-
tive announcement effect. And EAs that target on non-operating RPT have a strongly negative an-
nouncement effect. In addition, firms with RPT EAs are negatively correlated with the CEO duali-
ty. This is in contrast to the firms with RPT PAs since these firms tend to be positively correlated 
with the CEO duality and larger board size. The difference of the market reactions for the CEO 
duality between two samples might arise from the investors’ perception on the role that the dual 
CEO plays situated in different contexts.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. MOTIVATION
In 2014, the Public CompanyAccounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) adopted a new audit-
ing standard and amendments to its auditing standards to strengthen auditor performance
requirements in three critical areas that historically have represented increased risks of
material misstatement in company financial statements (PCAOB Release No. 2014-002).
The relationships and transactions with related parties are one of the “three critical areas1”.
In the PCAOB’s view, the related party transaction (RPT) has been a inseparable factor
in numerous financial reporting frauds over the last several decades2. According to the
2001 annual reports of all the public traded firms in China, 90% of them are involved in
different degrees of RPT (Wong and Jian, 2003). The importance of clarifying RPT with
accounting and auditing effort is thus indicated.
RPT has become an increasingly important issue in the world. It alerts the world since
the Enron scandal where RPT is used to disguise the financial condition for years3. In
China, the Zixin scandal has raised the investors’ vigilance in recent years. Jilin Zixin
Pharmaceutical Industrial Co., Ltd. claimed that the company’s financial profits in 2010
had nearly doubled due to significant growth in sales of its ginseng products. Eventually
it turned out that Jilin Zixin had inflated their earnings through illegal RPT and thus got
sanctioned by the regulatory institutions. Prominent corporate scandals involving RPT
undermined the investor confidence and resulted in the significant losses for investors.
RPTs are often diverse complex business transactions between a company and its man-
1The rest are a company’s significant unusual transactions, and financial relationships and transactions
with its executive officers. Significant unusual transactions are outside the normal course of business for
the company or that otherwise appear to be unusual due to their timing, size, or nature.
2Such prominent corporate scandals include Enron Corporation, Tyco International, Ltd., Refco, Inc.,
and WorldCom, Inc.
3Enron Corporation categorized its RPTs into SPEs as off-balance sheet items through which 81% assets
on its balance sheet was inflated. An SPE (special purposes entity) is an entity created by a sponsoring firm
to carry out a specific purpose or activity, or a series of transactions directly related to a specific purpose.
SPEs are often referred to as Structured FinancingVehicles, particularly when used to raisemoney ormanage
risk.
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agers, directors, or controlling holders4. Generally, there are two strands of literature re-
garding RPT. On the one hand, the non-arm’s length character of RPT makes it a possible
tool for a controlling shareholder to use for personal benefits against the interests of mi-
nority shareholders (conflict of interest hypothesis). This perspective implies that it would
be essential to curtail RPT and have it under rigorous control. On the other hand, the RPT
is described as efficient instrument for fulfilling specific economic needs (Gordon et al.,
2006), as it can compensate for market imperfection (efficient transactions hypothesis).
Therefore, a move to limit RPT would possibly damage a company’s financial perfor-
mance by undermining its ability to undertake such a transaction. (Moscariello, 2012).
Even though both two sides of RPT have been exposed to the prior discussions, the ma-
jority of existing studies focus on looking for the evidence of RPT under the conflict of
interest hypothesis. The regulators, market participants, and other corporate shareholders
commonly view RPT as representing the potential conflict of interest that can compro-
mises the management’s agency responsibility to shareholders or a board of director’s
monitoring function, leading to the expropriation of minority shareholders (Gordon et al.,
2006). Most of the earlier studies attempted to measure the potential expropriation of
RPT indirectly (Wong and Jian, 2003; Cheung et al., 2006; Gordon et al., 2006; Chen
and Chien, 2007; Jian and Wong, 2010; Peng et al., 2011). For instance, Gordon et al.
(2006) examined the relationship between dollar amounts of RPT and corporate gover-
nance mechanisms. They considered weak corporate governance mechanism as one of
the proxies indicating the likelihood of expropriation in RPT. Cheung et al. (2006) an-
alyzed the value effects of the initial announcement of RPT and speculated that certain
types of RPT are more likely to result in expropriation, considering the negative abnormal
stock return as an indicator.
However, an RPT is not necessary as a mechanism for fraud, and its presence does not
have to indicate fraudulent financial reporting (Henry et al., 2007). The indirect indicators
(such as a weak corporate governance mechanism) uncovered previously do not necessar-
4A related party can also be a subsidiary, a joint venture partner, a family member or an entity who has
control or significant influence over the company. Definitions and guidelines on RPT are summarized in
section 2.1.
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ily substantiate the existence of a harmful RPT. In spite of considerable anecdotal studies,
there are few studies to date providing direct evidence on the benign nature of of RPT,
or on the subsequent consequences following the execution of RPT. Therefore, there is
sufficient ground for an implication that it is important for the researcher to conduct the
hindsight analysis of RPT. In this way, reliable justifications can be made that whether
an RPT ultimately serves the interest of the controlling shareholder, or serves the normal
business operation of the company.
In contrast to previous studies, the purpose of this study is to attempt to fill in the gap
by examining the market reaction toward the enforcement actions (EAs) that are imposed
against RPT. This study provides direct evidence to the Chinese stock market on the spe-
cific features of RPT through which the expropriation actually occurs. It would be more
persuasive to find the real purpose of an RPT afterwards from the description in the EA,
rather than speculating beforehand.
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study raises two main questions regarding EAs against RPT: (1) what are the conse-
quences on the stock value of target firms with EAs, and (2) what specific factors affect
the investors in valuing the EA announcement for RPT? The purpose is to shed light upon
whether the EAs against RPT have a value effect in Chinese stock market, and to inves-
tigate the determinants of the value effect. The value effect of firms with RPT EAs is
compared to that of firms with RPT public announcements (PAs) 5. To answer the second
research question, the announcement effect of RPT EAs is decomposed into two compo-
nents related to market reactions for the announcement type and the transaction type.
For the first research question, this study investigates whether the market reacts signif-
icantly and negatively to the announcement of EAs against RPT that is undertaken by the
listed company in Chinese stock market. The research aims to give answers on how the
5The matched firms with PAs are defined in this study as having disclosed RPT publicly and carried it
out legally as well as properly without being imposed with EAs, for the purpose to be contrasted to the firms
with EAs.
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investors evaluate the information release on RPT violations around the announcement
period.
For the second research question, two factors are considered. The first factor concerns
the role of announcement type which is exclusively investigated on firms with EAs. The
announcement type classifies firms with EAs into two groups, i.e., EAs that include the
rectification actions, and EAs that do not include. Few studies have examined the rela-
tionship between the market reaction and the rectification actions for EAs. It is expected
that the presence of rectification actions weakens the negative value effect triggered by
EAs.
The second factor pertains to the characteristics of RPT’s transaction type. Convention-
ally, an RPT is classified according to its transaction format, such as purchase or sale of
goods, acquisition or disposal of assets, and borrowing or lending of cash, etc (Cheung
et al., 2006; Lei and Song, 2011). In contrast to the conventional classification, RPT in
this study primarily falls into two categories, i.e., “operating” and “non-operating”. The
purpose is to examine whether there are distinguished value effects relating to the defined
transaction types. If the distinguished value effects exist, it is worth to further examine
whether certain type of transaction has more severe value effect than others. The idea
of examining non-operating RPT in this study is analogous to few earlier studies where
operating and non-operating RPT are discussed (Bertrand et al., 2002; Kang et al., 2014).
Few studies in China have taken non-operating RPT into account, either. It is expected
that the investors react more negatively to the non-operating RPT with EAs.
In addition, firm characteristics associated with RPT, such as corporate governance and
ownership, are included in the analysis. Proxies of the CEO duality, board size and state
ownership are chosen based on the previous discussions (Gordon et al., 2006; Jian and
Wong, 2010; Peng et al., 2011) and the availability of proxy data in CSMAR database.
The presence of these three elements are also considered affecting the composition of
firms’ CARs.
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1.3. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN
This study offers a unique dataset that is composed of 168 publicly traded companies in
fiscal year from 2000-2013, a period that witnessed the China’s economy transition. It
begins with a sample of firms with RPT EAs (labelled as “treatment firm” or “treatment
sample”) released between January 2008 and July 2014. Then based on industry, firm size
and performance indicators, the sample of firms with RPT EAs are matched to a sample
of firms with RPT PAs (labelled as “control firm” or “control sample”). Control firms are
the benchmark to highlight the announcement effect of treatment firms.
The information of PAs on RPT and the data of initial announcement dates of control
firms are hand-collected from the company’s website. Financial data is obtained from
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, controlling for the
availability of daily stock return data. A detailed description of these transactions is pre-
sented, including types, frequency and starting time.
The market reaction, or the announcement effect is measured by the cumulative abnor-
mal return (CAR), which is calculated by the event study methodology. The differences
between variables in the univariate tests are tested with the two-sample t-test. The multi-
variate tests are modelled using the ordinary least squares (OLS) methods.
The reason that the sample of RPT with EAs is collected starting from 2008 is to take
the effect of the new accounting standards into consideration. A new set of accounting
standards were issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which is China’s accounting
standard setter, in February 2006 and effective from 1 January 2007. It is commonly
known as the New People’s Republic of China (PRC) Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). The New PRC GAAP (see detail in section 2.2.1.) adds several new
features to the scope of RPT and improves the regulation of RPT. Selecting EAs that were
released from January 2008 makes sure that all the RPTs that are sanctioned under the new
standards are included as the major components of the sample. Therefore, the up-to-date
data of RPT violations in China is allowed to be examined.
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Chinese listed companies provide abundant sources to the study on RPT. First, the ex-
plicit threshold for share issuance and delisting in China provides public companies with
earnings management incentives. And RPT is one of the popular methods to achieve the
earning target. Second, the business group structure of Chinese companies facilitates the
implementation of RPT. Historically massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had been
transferred to the group companies after the reform in 1990s. The inter-trading between
related companies within the same group is easily undertaken. Third, the weak legal sys-
tem in China is insufficient to regulate various forms of RPT and to protect the investors,
hence RPT becomes prevalent. Finally, Chinese investors react actively to the released
market information, therefore, a significant market reaction toward the announcement of
RPT can be detected to support the hypotheses of this study.
1.4. FINDINGS
First, market reacts negatively to the announcements of EAs against RPT compared to the
positive reaction toward RPT PAs. Approximately, CARs for EA announcements against
RPT are -1%  -1.2%, while CARs for public disclosure of RPT are 1%  3.2% with
significant differences. This suggests that there are systematic discounts on firm value
around announcement period if the firms are subject to RPT EAs. Publicly disclosed RPT
is reviewed, approved and announced through rigorous screening procedures, and ais un-
der the oversight of all investors. That is why firms with RPT PAs do not cause negative
market reactions.
Second, it is found that the correlation between CARs and EAs with rectification actions
are less negative than the correlation between CARs and EAs without rectification actions.
Market lowers the value of firms with EAs but will increase the evaluation by approxi-
mately 1.5% to 1.8% if the firm claims to rectify the situation referred in the EAs.
Third, among all the RPTs with EAs, non-operating RPTs account for a small percent
(38%) but yield stronger negative CARs than those for operating RPTs (-4.3% versus -
2.2%). This is coherent with the arguments of Bertrand et al. (2002) and Kang et al.
(2014) that non-operating activities are perceived by the market as with more likelihood
for tunneling. This finding also provides a new angle on the non-operating activities for
6
the academic studies about RPT in Chinese stock market.
In addition, on examination of corporate governance characteristics between two sam-
ples of firms, it is found that the market reactions for the CEO duality and board size
are positive for firms with PAs in contrast with the negative reaction for firms with EAs.
Specifically, CARs responding to RPT PAs are around 3% for CEO duality and 0.2% 
1.1% for larger board size, in comparison, CARs drop by around 3% for CEO duality of
firms with EAs. This provides evidence that the RPT should be analyzed case by case
under both the conflict of interest hypothesis, and the efficient transactions hypothesis.
The above results are also consistent with the findings of Gordon et al. (2006), Peng et al.
(2007) and Lei and Song (2011). Investors depreciate a firm that uses RPT to conduct
expectoration, but appraise a firm that intends to use RPT fairly and legally to achieve
normal operating target.
Taken together, the univariate results indicate that investors treat differently between RPT
with EAs and RPTwith PAs. Within the sample of firms with RPT EAs, it is found that the
abnormal returns are less negatively related to the firms whose EAs include the rectifica-
tion actions compared with the firms without the rectification actions. And the abnormal
returns are more negatively related to firms whose EAs are targeted on the non-operating
RPT than those related to firms with other types of RPT. It is interesting that firms with
EAs are negatively correlated with the CEO duality, whereas firms with PAs tend to be
positively correlated with the CEO duality and larger board size.
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the institutional
background of the Chinese stock market, definitions and legal framework of RPT. Section
3 discusses prior academic literature on RPT and research hypotheses. Section 4 describes
the sample creation, data collection procedures and research methodology. Section 5 re-
ports the results. The final section concludes the outcome of the study by highlighting its
contributions, practical implications, limitations and by making suggestions for the future
research.
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2. BACKGROUND
This chapter introduces the institutional background of RPT. Section 2.1 assembles the
definitions and the disclosure requirements for RPT from the sources of several major
conceptual frameworks for financial reporting. The stipulations from IAS 246, FAS 577
and Chinese Accounting Standards for Enterprises8 are quoted. Section 2.2 illustrates
the evolution of the regulatory framework of RPT in China, chronologically featured by
the capstone events on RPT. Section 2.3 briefly introduces the Chinese stock market and
explains the reasons that China is natural setting for the research on RPT issues.
2.1. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
A related party transaction is generally defined as any transaction taken place between
related parties, regardless of whether a price is charged. And a related party is a person
or entity who has control or significant influence over the company (Henry et al., 2007).
According to IAS 24, an RPT is a transfer of resources, services or obligations between a
reporting entity and a related party, regardless of whether a price is charged. A person or a
close member of that person’s family becomes a related party if that person is member of
the key management personnel of the company or of a parent of the company. An entity is
related to a company if that entity is in the same group with the company, it is an associate
or joint venture of a member of a group where the company belongs to, or the entity is
controlled by a related person, etc.
An entity shall disclose the parent-subsidiaries relationship irrespective of whether there
have been transactions between them. It also shall disclose key management personnel
6International Accounting Standards (IAS) were issued by the antecedent International Accounting Stan-
dards Council (IASC), and endorsed and amended by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures was reissued in November 2009 and applies to annual periods beginning
on or after 1 January 2011.
7Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 57 was issued in March 1982 for fiscal years ending after 15
June 15 1982 and superseded since the Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) became effective for
interim and annual periods ending after 15 September 2009. Both of them were established by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
8A new set of accounting standards were issued by the MOF in February 2006 and effective from 1
January 2007, commonly known as New PRC GAAP.
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compensation both in total and by categories. If an entity has had RPT during the peri-
ods covered by the financial statements, it shall disclose the nature of the related party
relationship as well as related information about those transactions, necessary for users to
understand the potential effect of the relationship on the financial statements.
Related parties are defined to include: affiliates of the enterprise; entities for which in-
vestments are accounted for by the equity method by the enterprise; trusts for the benefit of
employees; principal owners of the enterprise; its management; members of the immediate
families of principal owners of the enterprise and its management. Affiliate is described
as “a party that, directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, is con-
trolled by, or is under common control with an enterprise”. Examples of entities for which
the enterprise uses the equity method to account for include subsidiaries of the enterprise
or of the enterprise’s parent company. The management includes the three basic categories
of individuals: board members, executives, and principal owners.
Transactions between related parties commonly occur in the normal course of business.
FAS 57 had provided specific examples regarding the common types of RPT: sales, pur-
chases, and transfers of realty and personal property; services received or furnished; use
of property and equipment by lease or otherwise; borrowings and lendings; guarantees;
intercompany billings based on allocations of common costs; and filings of consolidated
tax returns. Transactions between related parties are considered to be RPT even though
they may not be given accounting recognition.
Other than the similar disclosures requirements as stated in IAS 24, FAS 57 required
that financial statements shall include disclosures of any material RPT. Moreover, it is
also noted that RPT cannot be presumed to carried out on an arm’s length basis, as the
requisite conditions of competitive, free-market dealings may not exist. This rule particu-
larly prevents some enterprises from implying that their RPTs are consummated on terms
equivalent to those normal business activities fairly traded in the market. Note that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (Section 402) now prohibits, in most cases, loans to directors
and executives.
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In China, it is the Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 36 that regulates the dis-
closure of information about the related party relationships and transactions. It defines an
RPT as an event whereby a transfer of resources, labor services or obligations takes place
between affiliated parties, irrespective of whether money is charged. When a party con-
trols, jointly controls or exercises significant influence over another party, or when two or
more parties are under the control, joint control or significant influence of the same party,
the related party relationships are constituted.
Holding the same disclosure requirements as other international standards, the Accounting
Standards for Enterprises No. 36 regulates that an enterprise shall disclose the information
about the parent company and subsidiaries, irrespective of whether there have been trans-
actions between them; where there have been transactions between an enterprise and its
affiliated parties, it shall disclose the nature of the related party relationships, the types of
transactions and the elements of transaction in the annotations. No enterprise may disclose
an RPT as a fair (arm’s length) transaction unless it provides exact proof. Specifically, if
a listed company engages in a transaction with the related natural persons of more than
RMB 300,000 (EUR 32,550), and if a listed company engages in a transaction with the
related legal persons of more than RMB 3 millions (EUR 325,000), which accounts for
more than 0.5% of the absolute value of the latest audited net assets of the company, it
shall disclosure such RPTs promptly. It is not purely the “related party-ness” of a trans-
action that warrants particular attention, but rather the transaction’s potential economic
effect on the company (Henry et al., 2007).
The objective of above standards is to ensure that an entity’s financial statements con-
tain the disclosures necessary to draw attention to the possibility that its financial position
and profit or loss may have been affected by the existence of related parties and by trans-
actions and outstanding balances, with such parties.
There are several terminologies overlapping with the definition of RPT. “Connected trans-
action (CT)” or “affiliated party transaction” is often used in academic research as an
equivalent term to RPT. Cheung et al. (2006) used the term “connected transaction” in
describing in the context of Hong Kong market. the Accounting Standards for Enterprises
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No. 36 actually uses “affiliated party transaction” in explaining RPT. However, the ma-
jority studies on RPT use the term “related party transaction” to refer to any transaction
between a company and an affiliated entity, therefore, this study also uses RPT as the pri-
mary designation.
Some terms are beyond neutrality more with negative sense, such as “self dealing”, “in-
sider trading”, “tunneling” or “propping”. Shapiro (1987) defined self-dealing as the ex-
ploitation of insider positions for personal benefit. López de Silanes et al. (2000) defined
tunneling as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling
shareholders, which are either undetected illegal fraud or transfer pricing advantageous to
the controlling shareholder. Wong and Jian (2003) used propping to describe the scenario
whereby a controlling owner uses its own resources to manage the listed related party’s
earnings, which is different from accruals management in which the controlling owner
or another related entity is not involved in the listed enterprise’s earnings management.
The wide variety in terminologies describing RPT and the complex transaction structure
highlight its role as a important subject in the main strand of business research.
2.2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF RPT IN CHINA
2.2.1. Development of regulations and standards on RPT
China is a late starter in formulating the regulatory rules governing RPT compared to US
and UK. During the recent decades the regulatory framework of RPT has experienced an
actively improving process in the Chinese financial market. The evolution process can be
generally divided into four stages9 marked by five significant promulgation or revisions
of major accounting standards in China.
• First stage: “1997 Disclosure Standard”
Since 1997 the MOF required public firms to disclose related party relations and
RPT to protect individual investors’ rights by promulgating the first detailed ac-
counting standard on RPT known as Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises:
9The first three stages of evolution for the regulatory framework of RPT were firstly proposed by Wang
(2003).
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Disclosure of Related Party Relationships and Transactions (labled as “1997 Dis-
closure Standard”). For the first time the scope of the related party was defined as
to whether one party has the power to control, jointly control or exercise significant
influence over the other party. The nature, type and other pertinent information of
the transaction should be disclosed in the financial statements.
• Second stage: “Debt Restructuring Standard” and “Non-monetary Transactions
Standard” in 1999
With the rapid development of capital market in the 1990s, non-monetary transac-
tion and debt restructuring has become prevalent means for earning manipulation,
e.g., assets swap and equity transfer. The MOF promulgated two accounting stan-
dards to regulate these two types of accounting business, i.e., Accounting Standard
for Business Enterprises: Debt Restructuring and Accounting Standard for Busi-
ness Enterprises: Non-monetary Transactions. A common essential feature is that
both of two standards have introduced the concept of fair-value measurement in
recording the asset. Theoretically, fair-value measurement truly reflects the finan-
cial position and operating performance of a listed enterprise, and it also integrates
with the international accounting practice. However, due to the lack of economic
environment for promoting the fair-value measurement, it became another favorable
means for earnings manipulation.
• Third Stage: “2001 Provisional Regulation”
Facing the deteriorated earnings manipulation behavior of RPT by taking advantage
of “unfair” fair value, the MOF issued the Provisional Regulations on the Account-
ing Treatments for Sale of Assets and other Transactions between Related Parties
on 21 December 2001 to fairly reflect RPT’s economic essence. It prescribes any
excess “gain” arising as a result of an RPT, which would have been measured on the
basis of the fair value of the goods or services sold, cannot be recognised as income
and must be credited directly to equity, unless there is sufficient evidence to support
that the transaction price is fair.
• Fourth stage: “New Disclosure Standard”
In February 2006, the MOF issued a new set of accounting standards, commonly
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known asNewPRCGAAP. The issuance of NewPRCGAAP represents amilestone
in domestic economic development and the international convergence of accounting
standards (KPMG, 2011). New PRCGAAP has been adopted since 1 January 2007.
The specific standard with regard to RPT is Accounting Standards for Enterprises
No.36: Related Party Disclosures
The latest “New Disclosure Standard” has achieved a comprehensive development com-
pared to the earliest “1997 Disclosure Standard” which was quite rudimentary and weak.
There are three new features brought by the “New Disclosure Standard” (KPMG, 2011):
• Definition of related party
In the “1997 Disclosure Standard”, parties are regarded as related to each other if
one party has the power to, directly or indirectly, control, jointly control or exercise
significant influence over the other party, or if two or more parties are subject to
control from the same party. The “New Disclosure Standard” expands the scope of
related parties. For example, two or more parties, which are subject to joint control
from the same party, are also regarded as related parties.
• Parent company’s key management personnel and their close family members
Parent company’s key management personnel and their close family members are
not regarded as the related parties in the “1997 Disclosure Standard”, whereas such
individuals are regarded as related parties in the “New Disclosure Standard”.
• Disclosure of RPT in the financial statements of a parent company provided together
with the consolidated financial statements
The “1997 Disclosure Standard” does not require disclosure of RPT in the finan-
cial statements of a parent company, when these are provided together with the
consolidated financial statements. The “New Disclosure Standard” has deleted the
exemption, and therefore such disclosure is required.
The MOF is not the only regulatory body in China in issuing accounting rules governing
RPT. RPT has been written into the Company Law and the Securities Law since 1999. In
1997 the CSRC required all publicly traded firms to disclose RPT in its circular Content
and Format Standards of Information Disclosure for Securities Issuing Companies No.7
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- Announcement on Related Party Transactions. In order to further regulate the fund flow
between listed companies and their respective controlling shareholders or other associated
parties, and effectively control the risks of listed companies in providing guarantee to any
other party, the CSRC and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Com-
mission (SASAC)10 jointly issued the Notice Concerning Some Issues on Regulating the
Funds between Listed Companies and Associated Parties and Listed Companies’ Provi-
sion of Guaranty to Other Parties on 28 August 2003. It stipulates that the controlling
shareholder and other associated parties shall not demand the listed company to advance
such expenses as wages, welfares, insurance premiums, advertisement fees, etc; a listed
company shall not provide an associated party with fund in any form, neither loans nor
interest-free financial assistance.
Issued in 2002 by the CSRC, theGuidelines for the Corporate Governance of Listed Com-
panies further concretes RPT’s legal existence by prescribing that written agreements shall
be entered into for RPT between a listed company and its connected parties. Such agree-
ments shall observe principles of equality, voluntarity, and making compensation for equal
value. The contents of such agreements shall be specific and concrete. Matters such as
the signing, amendment, termination and execution of such agreements shall be disclosed
by the listed company in accordance with relevant regulations. The formulation of these
regulatory rules has been pushing forward the conduction of RPT toward standardizing
accounting practice and improving the quality of disclosure information.
2.2.2. CSRC’s enforcement action
Immediately after China set up its two stock exchanges Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE),
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in the early 1990s, regulatory agencies were estab-
lished to enforce laws and regulations that govern the functioning of the securities market.
The CSRC is owning the comprehensive regulatory power over China’s securities indus-
10The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC)
is a special commission of the People’s Republic of China, directly under the State Council. It was founded
in 2003 through the consolidation of various other industry-specific ministries (Starr, 2010). As part of
economic reform, nearly half of state-owned enterprises were sold off in the form of stocks. SASAC is re-
sponsible for managing the remaining SOEs, including appointing top executives and approving anymergers
or sales of stock or assets, as well as drafting laws related to state-owned enterprises.
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try. It performs a unified regulatory function over the securities and futures market of
China, maintains an orderly securities and futures market order, and ensure a legal opera-
tion of the capital market. The two stock exchanges are delegated responsibilities by the
CSRC to monitor and supervise listed firms, brokers, dealers, and other market partici-
pants under their jurisdiction.
The CSRC has regional offices as well as a central location in Beijing. The main duties
of the CSRC are as follow11.
• Develop and formulate the policies and regulations for the securities markets.
• Exercise a vertical administration over the domestic securities regulatory institu-
tions.
• Supervise the issuance, listing and trading of domestic-based securities; monitor
domestic enterprises listed overseas.
• Supervise the securities market behavior of the listed companies and their senior
managerial personnel as well as shareholders who shall fulfill the relevant obliga-
tions according to the relevant laws and regulations
• Supervise the relevant institutions, including investment fund management compa-
nies, depository and clearing corporations, investment consulting institutions, and
securities credit rating institutions. Work with the relevant authorities in regulating
the accounting firms, the asset evaluation institutions, law firms, and their person-
nel.
• Investigate and penalize the activities in violation of the relevant securities and fu-
tures laws and regulations.
• Implement supervision on other financial products and services, including futures,
bonds and credit-rating.
The Securities Law states that “any individual or institution is prohibited from making
false, seriously misleading presentation or omission, or any other forms of false presen-
tation or inducement, which will lead investors to make investment decisions without
11Taken from the CSRC website (http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about).
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knowing the truth”. Enforcement is among the core missions of the CSRC, providing a
fundamental guarantee in ensuring market transparency, fairness and justice, protecting
investors and promoting sound development of capital markets. The collective action that
the CSRC takes to make sure the securities market order are being followed is the CSRC’s
enforcement action (EA). The CSRC’s EAs are made to investigate and penalize the vio-
lation activities of the relevant securities.
The process that the CSRC employs to investigate potential violations of securities laws
and regulations is somewhat akin to that of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in the US (Feroz et al., 1991; Chen et al., 2005). The EA is made based on the
investigation results by the CSRC and other cooperating regulatory bodies. And the in-
vestigation is initiated based on a number of leads. A CSRC’s news release12 reported
that the two major sources of leads have been stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSES) and
reporting from the public, respectively, accounting for 54% and 25% of all leads reported.
Meanwhile, a significantly higher number of leads were referred to the CSRC by admin-
istrations in charge of routine supervision. Specifically, according to Chen et al. (2005),
these leads include complaints from investors, information from insiders or former em-
ployees of firms, newspaper articles, analyses of annual reports and other corporate dis-
closures, referrals from the stock exchanges, legal disputes, and police investigations.
The CSRC or one of the two stock exchanges will start investigations following the leads.
The initial investigation activities are kept private. Should the evidence of wrong-doing
be uncovered, the CSRC can prescribe a series of rectification actions and make the re-
sults public. The results can be published by the CSRC, other regulatory agencies, or the
company. It is possible that the result is not released publicly if a violation is deemed to
be very minor then the CSRC will give an internal warning to the company and there will
be no public disclosure of either the investigation or its outcome.
Public EA includes public criticism, official warning, public censure, monetary fines, or-
12General Enforcement Overview in the Securities and Futures Markets between January and Octo-
ber 2013, published on 22 November 2013 (http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/
release/201402/t20140213_243771.html).
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der to cancel business permit and close down, and banning on the responsible parties from
market entry. Public criticism and official warning are the two mildest forms of EA, and
ban ofmarket entry is themost severe. Normallymultiple actions are collectively enforced
for the company involved . The amount of fines generally ranges from RMB 100,000 to
600,000 at the corporate level, and between 30,000 to 300,000 RMB at the individual level.
For individuals who commit the most severe violations of the regulations, the CSRC uses
market exclusion as the toughest sanction, thus, prohibiting the individuals from holding
positions such as top management executives or board directors for 3 years, even a life
time (Firth et al., 2014). For the most serious offenses, a criminal prosecution may be
imposed.
The laws and regulations actually provide a range of private rights of action for compensa-
tion in the event of non-compliance causing damage to investors, but the legal system and
the effect of market discipline provided by institutional investors and other participants on
corporate governance is not as significant in China as in other jurisdictions (Fund, 2012).
Therefore, though private EA can supplement and support the CSRC’s supervision and
regulation, it is not a substitute for public EA.
Improvemnt is still needed for the CSRC on establishing precise rules of EA disclosure.
Observing from the sample of current study, the content, publisher and releasing time
vary significantly for the CSRC’s EA. First, there is considerable detail in depicting the
case file from the specific violation behavior to the punishment, however, few details of
the investigation process are disclosed. Second, the publishers of EA are not uniform.
Some EAs are published by the CSRC or stock exchanges, some are announced by the
company. No explicit rules are found to clearly state under what circumstances should
EA be reported by which party or both. Third, the releasing time of EA is not consistent
with the case’s closure time. Some cases had been closed several years long before EA
is disclosed. And occasionally the contents of EA are known to the public a few days
before the official announcement by the CSRC. These advance disclosures are made by
the companies involved or by the news media.
Given that these observed inconsistencies tend to reduce the value effect of EA announce-
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ment, finding a significantly negative market reaction to EAs against RPT would provide
compelling evidence for the importance of RPT in Chinese stock market.
2.3. CHINA STOCKMARKET AS RESEARCH SETTING
2.3.1. Chinese financial market
The Chinese government has implemented a series of reforms in SOEs since 1978, and the
objective of these reforms is to improve operating performance, raise capital, decentralize
decision making and increase productivity (Peng et al., 2011). Due to historical reasons,
however, there were few outright privatizations because the state still retained sharehold-
ings in most companies and a large number of non-tradable shares exist in the Chinese
stock market. Typically, there are five types of Chinese shares:
• government shares, which are held by the StateAssetsManagement Bureau (SAMB);
• legal entity shares (or C-shares), which are held by other SOEs;
• employee shares, which are held by managers and employees;
• ordinary domestic individual shares (or A-shares), which can be purchased only by
Chinese citizens on the SHSE or the SZSE;
• foreign shares, which can be purchased only by foreign investors in mainland China
(B-share), in Hong Kong (H-share), or in the US (N-share).
The first three types of shares are not tradable on the official exchanges, although em-
ployee shares are allowed to be listed three years after the initial public offerings (IPOs).
These non-tradable shares cause severe agency problems. In 2005, the CSRC launched
a split-share structure resolution aimed at eliminating all non-tradable shares and trans-
ferring non-tradable shares into tradable shares. To exchange the rights for non-tradable
shares to become tradable, the holders of non-tradable shares will give part of their shares
free of charge to the holders of the corresponding tradable shares. A typical holder of non-
tradable shares will receive 2-3 shares for every 10 shares. Under this framework, non-
tradable shares eventually became tradable on the secondary market. This institutional
change has resulted in significant changes in ownership concentration, firm liquidity and
corporate governance (Luo and Jackson, 2012).
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By law, all shares in China have the same voting and cash-flow rights. Since May 2004,
SZSE has formally established a Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) board for grow-
ing firms. Meanwhile, the Chinese stock market was made partially accessible to foreign
investors. A-shares are available exclusively to Chinese domestic investors and are de-
nominated in the Chinese currency, the RMB. B-shares were initially only available for
purchase by non-residents but were later made available to domestic individuals in 2001.
H-shares are the Chinese stocks that list on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK).
SEHK provides a main board for major companies as well as a Growth Enterprise Market
(GEM) for growing firms that was established on November 25, 1999. Since 1993, there
has been a growing body of N-shares that list in the forms of stocks or American Depos-
itory Receipts (ADRs) on the US exchanges,including AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ.
The A-shares and B-shares are subject to the listing requirements by the CSRC, while
H-shares are subject to stricter listing requirements on SEHK, and N-shares are subjected
to the disclosure requirements of SEC. Since October 2009, SZSE also launched a GEM
board (commonly known as ChiNext) to attract innovative and fast-growing enterprises,
especially high-tech firms. ChiNext’s listing standards are less stringent than those of the
Main and SME Boards of the SZSE.
As of 15 April 2015, there are totally 2,683 firms and 2,766 securities listed in mainland
China, of which 1,030 firms listed on SHSE and 1,653 listed on the SZSE. Specifically,
there are 1,489 A-share stocks, 104 B-share stocks, 744 SME stocks and 429 ChiNext
stocks. Classifications of Chinese listed companies roughly fall into industrial, commer-
cial real estate, public utilities and conglomerates sectors.
2.3.2. Why Chinese data applies to this study?
A. Unique rules for share issuance and delisting RPT tends to be utilized for earnings
manipulation for the purpose of maintaining listing status. In China, a listed company
faces two types of risks after successfully listing: delisting and loss of the right to issue
new offerings (Wong and Jian, 2003; Jian and Wong, 2010; Peng et al., 2011). The Chi-
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neseCompany Law, Securities Law and regulations13 mandate that, if a listed firm sustains
losses for three consecutive years, it will be temporarily delisted by the CSRC and subject
to “particular transfer (PT)” and other transfer constraints. Specifically, according to the
guidelines introduced by the CSRC in 1999, a firm will have special treatment (ST) pre-
fixed to its name as a warning and will face various trading and financial restrictions if it
reports a net loss for two consecutive years (return on equity (ROE) is less than 0%). An
ST firm’s daily stock price movement is restricted to be no more than 5% price change
in either direction compared with a 10% for a normal stock. Additionally, its midterm
financial reports must be audited. If the firm continues to suffer a net loss for one more
year, it will be designated as a PT firm, entailing virtual suspension of trading. A PT firm
can only be traded on Friday, with a maximum 5% upside limit to last Friday’s close, but
no restriction on the downside. Further, a PT firm will be completely delisted if it cannot
become profitable in the following year14.
The rationale of making delisting decisions based on accounting earnings seems reason-
able because it can restrict firms that are in poor performance and thereby protect investor
interest. However, unlike China, exchanges around the world normally set minimum
price, minimum market capitalization, and/or minimum asset/revenue criteria for firms
to continue being listed. Jiang and Wang (2008) argued that the earnings-based delisting
system is misconstrued since such policies drive financially healthy firms out of stock
market, and induce listed firms to engage in rampant earnings manipulation in order to
avoid delisting.
13The Suspending and Terminating the Listings of Loss-making Listed Companies Implementing Proce-
dures (Revised) was issued by the CSRC on 30 November 2001, in which Article 5 stated that if a company
posts consecutive losses for the most recent three years, the stock exchange shall render a decision to sus-
pend the listing of the company’s shares within 10 working days of the date of disclosure of the company’s
annual report; Article 10 stated that after the listing of shares has been suspended, a company may apply
to the stock exchange for the restoration of its listing its interim financial report shows that the company
is making a profit. Since the delisting scheme was formally introduced, however, only 78 companies have
been actually pulled from the stock market. Recently on 17 November 2014 a guideline, Several Opinions
of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Reform, Improvement, and Strict Implementation of the
Delisting Rules for Listed Companies was released to tighten delisting rules in a bid to expel unqualified
companies from the equity market. According to the guideline, companies will be removed from the SHSE
and SZSE for major legal violations; Share trading of a company will be suspended after it is caught cheating
in share issuance or information disclosure; those who release false information can resume share trading
after taking remedial actions, but those who commit fraud in share issuance will not be absolved.
14From 2002, the CSRC cancelled the PT designation and introduced a new designation called *ST, which
is similar to ST but without the transition PT period.
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The other risk a listed firm faces is losing the right to issue new equities. Required by
the CSRC, a listed firm has to maintain a minimum ROE of 6% for three consecutive
years in order to be eligible for rights issue. In addition, the average ROE over these three
years must be kept at minimum 10%. Since a rights issue offering is an important source
of funds for listed firms after IPO, controlling shareholders would suffer a huge loss of the
private benefits of control from delisting or from the loss of the right to issue new equities
(Peng et al., 2011).
Therefore, the controlling shareholders have strong incentives to prop up the listed firm to
reach the earnings threshold. Even for the SOEs, government as the ultimate controlling
owner has strong incentives to help listed firms maintain their listing status. Other than
solely for profit maximization, the SOEs have other objectives such as to maintain em-
ployment and to control industries that are strategically important. Jian and Wong (2010)
provided evidence that Chinese listed firms use RPT to increase related sales and thus
boost earnings when they are in poor financial condition.
B. Business group The business group structure formulated in the reform during 1990s
facilitates the formation of RPT. A business group is “a set of firms, which, though legally
independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are ac-
customed to taking coordinated action” (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Such groups take
names like grupos or grupo economicos in Latin America, mining houses in South Africa,
family holdings in Turkey, and trading houses in India. The structure of this constella-
tion differs across countries and areas, with differences defined both by formal ownership
links, including the ownership roles of banks, families, the state, and other companies, and
by differences in the nature and strength of informal social networks (Morck et al., 2005).
Business groups in Korea are known as chaebol, a collection of both public and private
companies in a pyramidal and circular ownership structure, that are typically controlled
by members of a founding family (Kang et al., 2014). Japanese keiretsu are defined by
multiple corporate owners, often centred on a lead bank (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002).
Chinese business group (qiyejituan) are characterized by a core or parent firm that partly
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or wholly owns legally independent entities which are registered as affiliated firms of that
parent firm (Ma and Lu, 2005).
Beginning in 1987, the formation of business groups in the state-owned sector had been
promoted by the China’s reformers. Most of SOEs were transferred into business groups.
A number of private enterprises later emerged in the tide of reform also adopted a busi-
ness group structure. With the encouragement and assistance of the state, business group
in various scales and scopes proliferated rapidly in the 1990s in all sectors of the economy,
resulting in a dramatic growth in the number of business groups.
Business group structure generates group affiliations. And the group affiliation is con-
ductive to interactions within the network of affiliated entities. Therefore, group firms are
more likely to undertake RPT that can help member firms to reduce transactions costs and
overcome the difficulties in enforcing property rights and contract (Wong and Jian, 2003;
Fisman and Khanna, 2004). The other reason that RPT is frequent with business group
is that around 80% of the listed firms in China were previously production units that had
been separated from their parent SOEs, which serve as the controlling owners after the
listing. After the separtion and IPO, the listed subsidiaries continue to engage in frequent
RPT with their parent SOEs (Aharony et al., 2000).
Due to the information asymmetry in the market, finding reliable trading partners be-
come a key concern for a company. As China’s enterprise managers gained autonomy,
they faced decisions about with whom to trade for the first time (Naughton, 1996). Keis-
ter (2000) argued that managers responded to the uncertainties of imperfect markets by
forming stable relations with business partners who could credibly assure the provision of
critical resources. To identify credible partners, managers relied upon their contacts and
prior social/personal relations with former bureaucrats or peers within the group. There-
fore, RPT (such as trade and loans) can be performed with reliable related parties aiming
to reduce the potential risk.
C. Weak legal system The weak legal and market institutions in China imply a higher
likelihood of undertaking RPT (Cheung et al., 2006). In particular, laws governing in-
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vestor protection, the quality of enforcement of regulations, and ownership concentration
in Chinese market make it vulnerable to the disturbance of RPT.
López de Silanes et al. (1998) found that countries whose legal rules originate in the com-
mon law traditions tend to protect investors relatively better than the countries whose laws
originate from the civil law. For instance, minority shareholders in common law countries
(e.g., Australia) are allowed to vote by mail when they cannot show up in person and can
trade their shares during a shareholders’ meeting. They are protected from certain expro-
priations by directors, and need to have only 5% of share capital to call an extraordinary
meeting. In contrast, minority shareholders in civil law countries (e.g., Italy) cannot vote
by mail and their shares are blocked during the shareholder meeting. They need to have
20% of share capital to call for an extraordinary meeting. Therefore, investors in civil law
countries are less protected from the potential expropriation. The legal system in China
is similar to civil laws that give investors weaker legal rights than common laws do (Luo
and Jackson, 2012).
High ownership concentration is pervasive among Chinese public firms. Due to the fact in
China that only around 30% of listed companies’ shares are publicly tradable, and that the
controlling shareholders, on average, hold more than 40% of total shares, they are rarely
challenged by the minority shareholders, particularly in a state-controlled enterprises.
The ruling system is very weak since the CSRC is short of necessary investigative and
prosecuting power or resources. Because of the involvement of institutional and retail
shareholders in corporate governance is less well developed, more of the burden of deal-
ing with regulatory breaches falls onto the CSRC than in jurisdictions with easier access to
litigation to resolve disputes (Fund, 2012). Moreover, due to the high cost and complex-
ity involved in civil law system, minority investors usually find that it is difficult to sue
in courts for suspected violations. Although China is emerging as a significant economic
power, the role of legal system in minority shareholders’ protection is still very weak (Luo
and Jackson, 2012).
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D. Market reaction Chinese stock market responds actively to the information release
on RPT (Wong and Jian, 2003; Cheung et al., 2006; Lei and Song, 2011; Peng et al., 2011).
Fama (1970) in his classical study developed the efficient market hypothesis (EMH)which
argues that there are three versions of EMH reflecting the market efficiency: weak form,
semi-strong form and strong form. The weak-form EMH claims that stock prices can only
reflect historical prices. The semi-strong form of the EMH assumes that stock prices fully
reflect all publicly available information (e.g., earnings announcements, stock splits, etc.).
The strong-form EMH concerns about whether investors have instant access to any infor-
mation relevant for the price, even hidden or insider information.
The event study, which is employed in this study, is based on the event test of the semi-
strong form of the EMH. The semi-strong form assumes that the market is reflective of all
publicly available information. Under such hypothesis, the event study methodology can
be used to investigate the effects of public company news (MacKinlay, 1997). However,
the Chinese market is far from being semi strong (Hamid et al., 2010; Nisar and Hanif,
2012).
Nisar and Hanif (2012) used runs test and variance ratio test to examine the weak-form
EMH on seven major stock exchanges Asia-Pacific, among which data of Shanghai Com-
posite is included representing China. They found that China market is not weak-form
EMH since it exhibited considerable serial correlation and non-random walk of price
trends. Based on that the Chinese market is considered inefficient. Hamid et al. (2010)
also conducted test on the weak-form EMH of 14 countries and areas in the Asia-Pacific
region using monthly data from 2004 to 2009. After applying several statistical tests, they
got the same conclusion that China ia not weak-form efficient.
Although numerous studies have suggested that Chinese market is weak-form efficient
or inefficient, the event study has still been adopted extensively on Chinese data to exam-
ine the market reaction toward the announcement of major information release. Excess
return is generated and the valuation effect is quite strong (e.g., Chen et al., 2000; Barnes
and Ma, 2002; Peng et al., 2011). Chen et al. (2000) found significantly negative associ-
ation between modified audit opinions and abnormal stock return in China. Barnes and
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Ma (2002) applied the event study to investigate stock price reaction to the announce-
ment of bonus issues in China, and the results indicate positive returns for both A-share
and B-share holders. The B-share market even displays stronger evidence of semi-strong
form market efficiency than the A-share market. Peng et al. (2011) found strong market
reaction for the announcement of RPT, as well as for the specific characteristics includ-
ing transaction types and political connection. Additionally, Chinese traders are the most
active in the world and they are willing to take a short term view and trade regularly15.
Chinese investors are more likely to take a quick response to the investing news.
To sum up, China has four characteristics that make it well suited for this study. First, the
earning-based rules for share issuance and delisting in China provide public companies
with earnings management incentives. With the clear earnings targets set by the CSRC,
higher frequency of propping is expected. Second, as a result of the reform in 1990s,
numbers of SOEs were restructured to be business groups which is often composed of
several listed firms. The structure of business groups is tempted for RPT to be undertaken
between listed subsidiaries, parent company and controlling shareholders. Furthermore,
previous SOEs are supervised or managed by the bureaucrats who are appointed by the
government and are well acquainted or even related as well. The personal relationship
among the management easily leads to interest issue when RPT takes place. Third, the
imperfect legal system and market institutions are insufficient to regulate various forms
of RPT. Fourth, prior literatures indicate that the Chinese market is sensitive to the im-
portant announcements so that the event study is feasible. Moreover, there is significant
variation in the degree of market development of the geographical area of listed companies
across China’s different provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, which make
the control over RPT even harder.
15In a report by US, the results of State Street’s survey showed that 81% of retail investors in China
surveyed said they trade at least once a month.
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3. THEORYREVIEWSONRPTANDHYPOTHESISDE-
VELOPMENT
There are two main streams of prior studies about RPT concerning its role in a company’s
business activities. The first stream argues that RPT is the consequence of agency problem
between management and shareholders, or between majority shareholders and minority
shareholders. This view is referred to as the conflict of interest hypothesis. The second
stream considers RPT efficiently meet underlying economic needs of the company. This
view is commonly referred to as the efficient transactions hypothesis. This chapter elabo-
rates the theoretical background of RPT in these two streams, and reviews relevant factors
that are associated with RPT in previous discussions. Before getting the answers to the
research questions, several hypothetical assumptions are made in light of the literature
review.
3.1. CONFLICT OF INTEREST HYPOTHESIS
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed a theory to explain the agency conflict between
the listed firm’s owner-manager and outside shareholders as deriving from the manager’s
tendency to expropriate from the firm’s resources for personal benefit. An agency rela-
tionship is defined as a contract under which the principal engages the agent to perform
some service on his behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to
the agent. If both parties are rational people who are utility maximizers, the agent might
not act in the best interests of the principal. In such case, there will be divergence between
the agent and the principal who both want to make decisions that would maximize the
welfare of their own, and the conflict of interest thus rises.
The degree of ownership concentration affects the nature of contract that creates agency
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When ownership is diffused, agency problems
arise from the conflict of interests between top managers and outside shareholders. When
ownership is concentrated in few hands, the nature of agency problem shifts to the conflict
between the large shareholders andminority shareholders. Highly concentrated ownership
represents the dominance in the control rights, which gives large shareholders more dis-
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cretionary powers of using firm’s resources to serve their own benefit at the expense of
other minority shareholders. Therefore, RPT raises concerns of agency problems from
the perspective of conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders
(Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004). The controlling shareholders can take advantage of the
controlling power, engaging in RPT in order to expropriate wealth of minority sharehold-
ers. In very few cases RPT leads to misstatement of financial reports if it is off the book
and intendeds to cover its substance to deceive investors (e.g., Zixin scandal).
RPT can also be used as a means for earnings management, such as to prop up the revenues
above the minimum criteria of listing requirement so that the listing status is maintained.
“Propping” actually is under the efficient transaction hypothesis since it is beneficial in
the sense that it aims to avoid the substantial loss for both firms and stakeholder, such
as fund injection from controlling shareholder (Friedman et al., 2003). But it also may
hurt the interest of shareholders of the firm whom the funds transfer from, if the financial
support for a listed subsidiary is allocated from another listed subsidiary16. In this case,
RPT brings the conflict between the management and outside shareholders.
A. Earnings management As the agent who has been empowered by shareholders to
make decisions, a manager has the tendency to have personal goals that different from
those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The conflict interest, thus, leads to
potential agency costs. Earnings management can be a type of agency cost if managers
release financial reports that do not present an accurate economic picture of the firm, and
shareholders make non-optimal investment decisions as a result (Davidson et al., 2004).
Therefore, earnings management is related to the agency conflict between managers and
shareholders.
Gordon et al. (2006) probed the hypothesis of interest conflict with a sample contain-
ing 878 RPTs of 112 companies with both 2000 and 2001 financial information. They
16The Salim group injected funds from a publicly listed Hong Kong company into a publicly listed In-
donesian company for bailout. Some minority shareholders of the Hong Kong company have complained
that this transaction amounts to expropriating them in order to prop up the Indonesian company. The Salim
Group is Indonesia’s biggest conglomerate with assets including Indofood Sukses Makmur, the world’s
largest instant noodle producer, and Bogasari, a large flour-milling operation.
27
examined relations between RPT and corporate governance mechanisms, as well as rela-
tions between firm’s industry-adjusted returns and dollar amount of RPT. They found that
some RPTs are to the detriment of shareholders and there are conflicts of interest between
managers/board members and their shareholders. This evidence supports the hypothesis
of interest conflict. Gordon and Henry (2005) examined 331 US-listed firms’ RPT dis-
closures in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 in the aftermath of the Enron crash unfolding in
2000 to investigate whether RPT is associated with earnings management. They found
that earnings management only has limited connection with certain types of transactions
such as those involving fixed-rate financing from related parties.
It appears that concerns about RPT as a factor associated with earnings management are
warranted, but themere presence of RPT is not necessarily an indication that a firm is likely
to engage in greater earnings management. It is the involved parties’ type and incentive
that decide the potential chance of earnings management. If the involved party is an ex-
ecutive who is closely tied to the company, he has less incentive to engage in risk-taking
behavior such as earnings management. Also any benefits accruing directly to the related
party as a result of the RPT could mitigate incentive to manage earnings for the purpose
of increasing wealth, for example through bonuses or other compensation tied to earnings.
Wong and Jian (2003) examined 131 Chinese listed firms in materials industry and found
that firms that are controlled by corporate group engage in more RPTs than firms that are
not. Group-controlled firms report abnormally high levels of related party sales mainly to
their controlling shareholders when they have incentives to inflate earnings prior to issuing
new equity or to avoid being delisted. Jian and Wong (2010) also stated that controlling
owners of Chinese listed firms engage in propping through related sales. The increase
in related sales are used to restrain negative industry earnings shocks when listed firms
have incentives to manage earnings. By using such inter-company trades to meet securi-
ties regulators’ earnings targets, the controlling owners help the listed firms maintain their
listing status or qualify for rights issues. The negative stock returns indicate that investors
perceive those RPTs as opportunistic and consider the earnings from RPT are less credible
than from arm’s length transactions. Firm value is also negatively associated with RPT.
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B. Expropriation Since RPT is frequently utilized for the expropriation of minority
shareholders, it leads to the major concern about the agency conflict between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders.
López de Silanes et al. (2000) used the term “tunnelling” to characterize the expropriation
of wealth by controlling shareholders of a company from the minority shareholders. They
argued that a controlling shareholder can simply divert resources from the firm for his own
benefit through RPT. Such transactions include illegal outright theft or fraud, asset sales,
transfer pricing favoring the controlling shareholder, excessive executive compensation,
loan guarantees, expropriation of corporate opportunities, and so on. Some tunnelling,
especially theft or fraud, tends to be undertaken in emerging markets. Peng et al. (2011)
used CT data from China covering 1998 through 2004 to test the possibility of Chinese
companies engaging in tunnelling under certain circumstance. They argued that control-
ling shareholders are more likely to use CT to tunnel from the listed firm to benefit other
member firms when the listed firm is in sound financial condition. They also found that
there is not much difference among different transaction types, suggesting that all of those
transaction types can be used for tunnelling depending on the financial situation of the
firms.
Furthermore, Chen and Chien (2007) examined a large set of sample of listed compa-
nies in Taiwan and found that RPT produces more negative impact on performance in
companies with unitary leadership, and in companies with over 40% divergence between
controlling rights and cash flow rights, than those with a dual leadership and those with
a below 40% divergence. Unitary leadership means that the positions of board chairman
and CEO are held by same individual. If a firm adopts unitary leadership structure, the
independence and power of the board may be compromised (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
However Peng et al. (2011) did not find significant impact on the announcement effect
of CT from the divergence between control rights and ownership. Empirical relationship
between RPT and firm-specific characteristics are reviewed in section 3.3.
In auditing research, failure to identify RPT is found to be one of the top ten audit de-
ficiencies in a study of enforcement actions by the SEC against auditors (Beasley et al.,
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2001). Recent years quite a few large-scale corporations’ accounting scandals (e.g., Enron
scandal) show the involvement of RPT as a approach to disguise company’s financial con-
ditions. This phenomenon has raised considerable concern among market participates and
regulators on undisclosed or undetected RPT. Shareholders are likely to suffer substantial
loss from the stock price decline of the invested companies resulted from bankruptcy, or
from public release concerning the undisclosed events,such as EAs by the regulatory body.
Enron’s share price dropped from a high of $83.13 on 31 December 2000 to less than a
dollar by the end of November 2001 (Bratton, 2001). In China, Jilin Zixin’s stock value
fell by 7.29% right after the investigation on the undisclosed related trading was revealed
to the public17.
According to the collected EAs’ samples, RPT is sanctioned due to nondisclosure or fab-
rication with intentions to cover up the real purposes that may be disadvantageous to mi-
nority shareholders and investors. Therefore it is expected that market reacts unfavorably
to the RPT with EAs. The expectation is formalized in H1a:
H1a. The announcement of EAs against RPT would have a significantly negative effect
on the stock performance of the target company.
3.2. EFFICIENT TRANSACTIONS HYPOTHESIS
In contrast with the first view, the efficient transaction hypothesis assumes that RPT in-
volves sound business exchanges, efficiently fulfilling economic needs of a company
(Gordon et al., 2006). Therefore, it does not harm the interests of shareholders and emerges
as an efficient contracting arrangement in the market where information is incomplete and
asymmetric (Pizzo, 2013). RPT acts as a form of internal dealing which is able to re-
duce transaction costs and increase efficiency through the creation of an internal market
within the group-affiliated corporation, especially in less-developed regions (Fisman and
Khanna, 2004).
17Taken from the website of China News Service (http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2013/
09-04/5242029.shtml).
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A. Propping Friedman et al. (2003) assembled several cases showing RPT playing a
strategic role in transferring private resources from entrepreneurs into firms that have mi-
nority shareholders in the backwash of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. Lee
Kun Hee, Chairman of Samsung Group, donated some his personal wealth to pay off the
debts of Samsung Motors Inc. which was a subsidiary on the verge of bankruptcy in 1999.
The controlling shareholders in the Charoen PokphandGroup18 sold assets in Thailand and
China in order to inject cash into publicly listed Thai companies. The Salim group sold
privately held assets in Netherlands to bail out publicly listed operations in both Philip-
pines and Indonesia.
Besides presenting that RPT can provide temporary support to a firm that is in trouble,
Friedman et al. (2003) developed a model arguing that it is optimal for entrepreneurs to
prop when there is a moderate adverse shock, so that the firm stays in business. They also
argued that Asian firms in pyramids are more prone to propping, which is consistent with
the impetus of this study choosing Chinese public company as a research setting.
B. Resource allocation Fisman and Khanna (2004) conducted a series of interviews of
Indian managers and executive from group-affiliated companies to analyze edges of RPT
in a business group. They argued that a key role of RPT is to create a internal market and to
facilitate the operation of entire group. Company usually faces two difficulties in choosing
suppliers, which are either in bad quality or located distantly. Things get worse when a
potential producer is located in less-developed areas where there is insufficient demand to
stimulate the development of supporting industries. The basic inputs and repair services
must therefore have to be sourced from relatively remote suppliers. Group corporations,
by contrast, already have well-established supplier networks, and are able to coordinate
the delivery of materials through a centralized bureaucracy. Thus RPT often exits wherein
suppliers come from a company which itself is a group-affiliate. Finally company obtains
financial support more easily from group than from bank in terms of lower interest rates
or even free interests.
18The Charoen Pokphand Group is Thailand’s largest private company, and is one of Asia’s largest con-
glomerates.
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Pizzo (2013) held the same view as Friedman et al. (2003) that RPT may provide a better
allocation of financial resources, economies of scale, easier access to finance and more
opportunities in an institution which is short of efficient capital, labour and product mar-
kets. This argument applies to some developing countries or areas where exist information
problems, agency problems, and market imperfections that may increase the risks associ-
ated to firm activities.
C. Knowledge sharing Fisman and Khanna (2004) also argued that one of the advan-
tages of RPT lies in the human resource in that it secures in-depth skills and expertise.
For example, a company is looking for a provider of legal service and there happens to
be a non-executive director who possesses legal expertise that the company demands. In
this case, hiring the director (engaging an RPT) could be more effective and less risky
than hiring an outsider to participate the negotiation on contract. Because that director
possesses an extensive knowledge of the firm, thus reducing the information asymmetries
and enhancing the contract. Not only does the company acquire the needed services, but
engaging the director to provide the services can solidify the director’s economic bond to
company and escalate the director’s commitment.
D. Coordination Pizzo (2013) concluded that RPT helps to unite a business group for
better coordination. First, contracting parties’ representatives appointed as boardmembers
facilitate the achievement of better coordination of different activities, quicker feedback
or more insights. Second, deeper reciprocal knowledge as well as greater familiarity can
justify transactions that are not feasible at arm’s length or create more convenient terms
and conditions for both parties. Third, hold up problem may be mitigated. Finally, these
transactions may also supplement CEO and director with cash remuneration or compen-
sate them for increased risk.
A presumed efficient RPT has to be disclosed to be “approved” by the investors ulti-
mately. Whether the transaction is discloseable or not affects investor’s reaction. Lei and
Song (2011) analyzed CTs of 181 China-affiliated companies listed on the SEHK before
31 October 2004. Transactions included in their study are CTs with disclosure exemp-
tions and CTs that are discloseable. They found that the market reacts negatively to CTs
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with disclosure exemptions but positively to connected and discloseable transactions. A
possible reason is that firms are prone to using smaller CTs with disclosure exemptions
to tunnel since small-sized CTs do not require independent shareholders’ approval or the
distribution of circulars according to Hong Kong’s legal settings. In contrast, lager-sized
CTs are subject to more stringent and more detailed disclosure requirement, and indepen-
dent shareholders can intervene in the transactions.
Under the efficient transaction hypothesis RPT would not have adverse impact on share-
holders. Moreover, disclosed RPT represents the fact that the transaction has been scru-
tinized beforehand and is under monitoring by regulatory institutions, which results ad-
ditional information and procedures that are of some value to investors. Therefore, it is
expected that the CARs of firms with RPT PAs are higher than those of firms with RPT
EAs. The expectations are formalized in H1b:
H1b. The market would react positively to the disclosed RPT with PAs.
3.3. OTHER FINDINGS
3.3.1. Announcement types
Chen et al. (2005) categorized EAs types into public criticism, public condemnation, warn-
ing and fines, and tested CARs associated with the severity of the penalty. They found
that the public condemnations and warnings are associated with more negative reactions
than the public criticisms have. Public condemnations and warnings attract more severe
price reactions than fines do. Firth et al. (2014) constructed a severity score by taking into
consideration the existence of multiple sanctions rather than merely using the most serious
sanction.
However, few discussions have attempted to look into the relationship between reification
actions and EAs. According to a CSRC Announcement issued in 200819, listed compa-
nies shall make explanations on the issues under rectification in their rectification reports
19http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/overRule/Announcement/200807/
t20080724_71014.html
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and disclose publicly on the websites designated by the CSRC. The rectification report
shall include specific contents, such as whether the rectification can be completed in the
prescribed time or not, and the rectification effect of problems under continuous improve-
ment and further improvement plan. This leads to a speculation that whether the investors
would become less unpleasant about the RPT with EAs when they see the rectification
measures have or will be taken to fix the problems.
Feroz et al. (1991) analysed the impact of corrections required by the SEC on the de-
clines in enforcement targets’ market returns. Using 224 AAERs issued between 1982
and 1989 which describe allegations of financial disclosure violations by 188 firms, they
examined the financial andmarket impact of the SEC enforcement programwhich consists
of a series of legal actions. The legal actions include investigations, subsequent injunctive
actions, and administrative proceedings against offending registrants and auditors. One of
the main findings is that the abnormal returns relative to the first disclosure of the alleged
violations are negatively associated with the correction consequences. It means that the
sanctioned companies’ corrective actions have narrowed the gap of abnormal returns sur-
rounding the disclosure days and gradually improve the investors’ confidence. Therefore
the inclusion of rectification actions is assumed to reduce the weak stock returns induced
by EAs. The following hypothesis is made:
H2a. Market would react less negatively to the announcement of RPT EAs with recti-
fication actions than those without rectification.
3.3.2. Transaction types
Companies intending to tunnel may employ any type of RPT. In practice, however, only
certain types of RPT are used frequently to facilitate the expropriation of minority share-
holders, and investors may anticipate the expropriation by discounting the company’s
stock price. Cheung et al. (2006) classified CTs into three broad categories: transac-
tions that are a priori likely to lead to expropriation (asset acquisitions, asset sales, equity
sales, trading relationships, and cash payments to connected parties), transactions that are
likely to benefit the listed firm (cash receipts and subsidiary relationships) and transac-
tions that may have been motivated by the strategic rationale (takeover offers and joint
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ventures, joint venture stake acquisitions and sales). After examining a sample of 328
filings of CTs between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders
during 1998-2000, they found that for the first category of CTs considerable shareholder
value is undermined both during the initial announcement of the transaction and during the
12-month period following the announcement. Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) classified
ten types of RPT, and found that the most common types of transaction are related busi-
ness activities and loans to related parties; the least common transactions are borrowings
from related parties.
Consistent with Kohlbeck and Mayhew’s finding, Henry et al. (2007) got similar results
by examining the role of RPT in 83 SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAER) which share similar features as the CSRC EAs in this study. It was concluded
that loans to related parties are the most frequent type of RPT in the enforcement cases
examined, and most of them in nature are the transfer of wealth to controlling sharehold-
ers because loans are lent to a related party at below-market interest rates. The next most
frequent type of RPT is the purchase (sale) of goods or services from (to) related parties,
where the transaction is either undisclosed, unapproved or non-existent. Non-reported
purchases from a related party understate expense and thus overstate income. Purchases
from a related party of non-existent or unnecessary goods or services, or purchases at
above-market prices can transfer wealth to the related party. Fictitious sales to a related
party could be used to inflate reported income. To distinguish the impact of certain type of
RPT on CARs, it is expected that some transactions are perceived to be beyond the normal
nature of operating activities and the CARs will be lower.
Lei and Song (2011) also intended to find out what kind of transactions are viewed as
facilitating tunnelings by examining CARs and firm value, and classified RPT according
to the transaction format. The authors created “Continuing” category to contain small-
value transactions which are carried out on a continuing basis, such as sale and purchase
of goods and services, or tenancy agreements. The “Contractual Agreement” category
contains one-off payment projects, such as building of factories, vessels. “Placement”
includes the increase of registered capital or capital injection into the company. The rest
are the same as other studies’ classification: acquisition and disposal of assets, acquisition
35
and disposal of interests, and loan and guarantee.
Similar to Cheung et al. (2006) and Lei and Song (2011), most of prior studies split RPT
into very specific types based on the superficial transaction format. However, few studies
have explored its nature, which is what the transaction is used for, i.e., improving recur-
ring operating performance, or facilitating non-operating activities. In the current study
most of the selected announcements for firms with RPT EAs put emphasis on describing
violations without revealing the format of RPT in detail (sale or purchase, assets or goods,
loans or guarantee). Therefore, it is impractical to simply classify the RPT in the way
that previous research did. It is more practical to track the origins as to whether the trans-
action serves the company’s core business by interpreting it from the context. Generally
non-operating transactions with related parties are often the sales/purchases of property,
plants, and equipment (PPE) and investment assets. An example of classification is illus-
trated in Appendix A.
Bertrand et al. (2002) examined the mechanisms of tunneling in Indian groups, which
appear to tunnel by manipulating non-operating components of profits, such as miscella-
neous and non-recurring items. They also found that non-operating losses and gains are
used to offset real profit shocks or divert cash from other firms. The findings indicate that
transfer pricing which would affect operating profits is not a primary source of tunneling
in India. Using firm-level data from publicly traded firms in Korea, Kang et al. (2014)
investigated whether the RPT is used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms belong-
ing to large business groups in Korea, proxied by the control–ownership wedge. While
significant positive association is found both between the control–ownership wedge and
operating RPT, and between the control–ownership wedge and non-operating RPT, only
none top-tier firms use non-operating RPT.
This study attempts to look at the RPT types from a new perspective with regards to the
relationship between market reactions and non-operating RPT:
H2b. Market would react more negatively to the non-operating RPT than to other types
of RPT.
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3.3.3. Corporate governance mechanisms
Corporate governance has been frequently examined in prior studies as an inseparable
mechanism breeding RPT. Gordon et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between
RPT and the corporate governance mechanisms (such as board characteristics, CEO pay-
performance sensitivity, and outside monitors), they generally found weaker corporate
governance mechanisms associated with higher dollar amounts of RPT.
CEO duality Several studies have proved the disadvantages of the duality of CEO and
chairman, postulating that agency problems are higher when the same person holds both
positions, as the concept “unitary leadership structure” referred in section 3.1. Yermack
(1996) used 452 companies drawn from the annual Forbes magazine rankings of the 500
largest US public corporations between 1984 and 1991, and found that firms are valued
more highly when the CEO and chairman positions are separated. Brown and Caylor
(2006) created a broad measure of corporate governance, Gov-Score, and related it to the
operating performance and valuation for 2,327 firms. They found that firms are more
valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are separate.
Hopt and Leyens (2004) contributed to the discussion on the tendency in Europe toward
the efficient internal management control by quoting the board models in Germany, UK,
France and Italy. They showed a striking convergence in the awareness of the distinction
between management and control which encourages the separation of CEO and board
chairman. Henry et al. (2012) investigated how the quantitative and qualitative impacts
collectively differ between RPT frauds and non-RPT frauds using a logistic regression. It
is indicated that RPT fraud cases are more likely to involve the CEO and/or CFO than are
non-RPT frauds. Therefore, it is expected that CARs reduce when the company’s CEO
and chairman are the same person.
Opposited to the agency theory about CEO duality, stewardship theory argues that CEO
duality may be good for performance due to the unity of command it presents (Peng et al.,
2007). Peng et al. (2007) examined 403 firms listed on the SHSE and SZSE and found
stronger support for stewardship theory which argues that CEO duality is good for firm
performance due to the unity of command it presents. Such a positive impact is especially
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likely to be profound for firms confronting problems associated with resource scarcity and
environmental dynamism.
Board size There are mixed views on whether companies should keep larger or smaller
board size. Proponents of smaller board size argue that limiting board size is believed
to improve firm performance because the benefits by larger boards of increased monitor-
ing are outweighed by the poorer communication and decision-making of larger groups.
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) stated that “the norms of behavior in most boardrooms are dys-
functional” because directors rarely criticize the policies of top managers or hold straight-
forward opinions about corporate performance. Considering that these problems increase
with the number of directors, Lipton and Lorsch recommended a preferred board size of
eight or nine, and proposed that a “lead director” be selected from this group to consult
with the CEO about the board’s agenda, membership, and operation.
Jensen (1993) took up this theme by holding same ideas that keeping boards small can
help improve their performance. When boards get beyond seven or eight people they are
less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control. He conjectured
that there is a possibility that the animosity and retribution originating from the human
nature of CEO is too great, thus it is almost impossible for those who report directly to
the CEO to participate openly and critically in effective evaluation and monitoring of the
CEO. Therefore, the only inside board member should be the CEO. Jensen pushed Lip-
ton and Lorsch’s proposals further, arguing that all directors except the CEO should come
from outside a company, and that the CEO should be prohibited from serving as chair-
man of the board. Using 1,261 firms included in the S&P 1500 in 2001, Kohlbeck and
Mayhew (2004) developed a logit estimation model to examine potential determinants of
RPT. In terms of monitoring mechanisms, the multivariate results showed that board size
is positively associated with the probability of RPT, namely larger board size increases
the likelihood of RPT.
Opponents believe that larger board size is not a big issue. Klein (2002) collected data
about boards and board audit committees from SEC-filed proxy statements including 803
firm-year observations, and found that audit committee independence increases with board
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size and board independence. Using a sample of 252 industrial firms from the Lehman
Brothers Fixed Income database and the S&P 500, Anderson et al. (2004) found a nega-
tive relation between board size and the cost of debt financing. Specifically, they found
that an additional board member is associated with about a 10 basis point lower cost of
debt financing, presumably because creditors view these firms as having more effective
monitors of their financial accounting processes. Brown and Caylor (2006) showed that
firms with board sizes of between six and fifteen have higher returns on equity and higher
net profit margins than do firms with other board sizes.
Adams and Mehran (2005) examined the relation between board structure (size and com-
position) and firm performance using a sample of banking firms during 1959-1999. Con-
trary to the evidence for non-financial firms, they found that banking firms with larger
boards do not underperform their peers in terms of Tobin’s Q. Their findings suggested
that constraints on board size in the banking industry may be counter-productive. Inspired
by this study, Chen (2014) investigated how board structure impacts firm performance
that are unique in China. Using a World Bank survey of 2,400 public and private firms
across 18 Chinese cities, he found evidence that when firms operate in a weak property
rights environment more outsiders improve performance. Thus listed firms with larger
board and more outsider directors have better performance in China.
Directors Compensation The compensation of directors has also been found to be cor-
related with firm performance, with a larger proportion of the pay-performance sensitivity
coming from share and option ownership. Yermack (2004) found that the wealth of out-
side directors changes by 6.1 cents for a $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth (out of a
total pay-performance sensitivity of 11 cents). Gordon et al. (2006) discovered that there
are more RPTs when more annual remuneration is paid to board executive members and
company gives stock and options to directors. The following hypothesis based on these
expectations can be made:
H2c. The market would impose a governance discount to firms engaged in RPT. And the
stock reaction to the corporate governance characteristics of firms with RPT EAs would
be lower.
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4. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the sources of data, methods of data selection, and defines the
variables used in the empirical analysis. In order to capture the market reaction, the event
study methodology is employed to test the impact of announcement effect of RPT on the
magnitude of abnormal stock performance around announcement period.
4.1. DATA SELECTION
4.1.1. Selection of treatment firms
Totally 1,607 EAs of publicly traded companies listed on the SHSE and SZSE are searched
initially between January 2008 and July 2014. They are obtained fromCSMAR’s Enforce-
ment Actions Research Database developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology
Co., Ltd. Out of the 1,607 issuances, 185 EAs (of 150 companies) are filtered using search
term “related” or “related party”. Although 185 EAs include one or more of the search
terms, only 151 observations use the terms in the context of describing a violation event
concerning RPT. After excluding 34 EAs with loose connection to the target research
question and 28 with insufficient stock data around announcement period, 123 EAs of
118 companies in the treatment sample are available for further analysis (see Table 1).
There are two reasons for the sample of EAs to be collected starting from 2008. First,
the New PRC GAAP, effective from 2007, improves the regulation of RPT. Selecting
EAs that were released after 2008 makes sure that all the RPTs that are sanctioned under
the new standards are included as the major components of the sample. So that the up-to-
date feature of RPT violations in China is allowed to be examined.
Second, the 2008 financial crisis led to a declining economy where companies had pen-
chant for using RPT to overcome difficulties and survive, as RPT observed during in the
Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 (Wong and Jian, 2003; Wilson et al., 2013). The RPT
was primarily undertaken for solving financial difficulties (e.g. financing and propping).
But it was exploited by opportunistic managers or large shareholders to manipulate earn-
ings or divert resources away from their companies. Therefore, growing numbers of RPT
are allowed to be witnessed after 2008.
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Table 1: Selection of Treatment Firms
This table presents the selection procedures for the sample of treatment firms. Totally 1,607 EAs of firms
listed on the SHSE and SZSE from 2000-2013 are identified from CSMAR database. EAs are released
from January 2008 to July 2014. The identified RPT is undertaken with the initial time from 2000-2013.
The initial public announcement date of EAs is obtained from CSMAR database. There are 185 EAs that
mention of any the search terms “related” or “related party”. 34 EAs are excluded from the full set of 185
EAs due to irrelevancy, overlapping and foreign share. 151 EAs of 142 firms are left for further matching.
There are also 28 EAs having missing daily stock returns around the announcement date. Thus, 123 EAs of
118 treatment firms are remained in the preliminary treatment sample.
Panel A: Sample selection
EAs Firms
Total EAs searched 185 150
Less irrelevant EAs -8 -
Total RPT-mention EAs 177 -
Less overlapping EAs -15 -
Less EAs on the same declaring day -10 -
Less B share -1 -
Total EAs 151 142
(matching base)
Less EAs with insufficient stock returns -28 24
Total 123 118
Panel B: Distribution of frequency
EAs Firms
Once 113 113
Twice in one year 2 1
Twice in two years 8 4
Total 123 118
The amount of originally searched EAs (185) is reduced to 151 by eliminating 34 EAs as
shown in Table 1. Detailed explanations for the exclusion are listed as below.
• There are 8 EAs that are irrelevant and not involving any of the RPT cases in spite
of the key word “related”. One example is that Boyun New Materials Co., Ltd. was
alleged to commit insider trading since two “related” persons made profit by trading
company’s stocks in blackout period.
• There are 15 overlapping EAs filed for actions targeting on the same RPT of a single
company. Because they are released by different regulatory institutions including
the CSRC, SHSE and SZSE at national level, and various securities regulatory bu-
reaus of provincial capital at reginal level. For examples, a public censure was made
by SHSE on Yaxing Chemical Co., Ltd. in 2012 for undisclosed material RPT, how-
ever, an administrative punishment was issued by the CSRC later in 2013 for the
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same violation. In this case, there are two EAs collected but only keeping the EAs
released earlier in the sample.
• There are 10 EAs possessing the same declaring date for those companies who have
more than one EAs announced in the same day. It happens when some EAs are pri-
vate warnings sent by regulatory institutions and the company later announces them
all to the public in a same day. For example, Dongfang Energy Co., Ltd. received 6
EAs in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013 yet did not have them announced until 2013 in
a composed file.
• One B-share company is removed from the sample because this study only focuses
on A-share (see the introduction on Chinese shares of stock market in section 2.3)
company.
4.1.2. Selection of control firms
To study the difference of announcement effect between the sanctioned RPT and the nor-
mally disclosedRPTwhich is compliant with the related trading rules, I adopt thematched-
pair methodology, which is to match firms with RPT EAs (treatment firms) to firms with
RPT PAs (control firms) based on specified firm characteristics.
Thematching approach followsBarber and Lyon (1997), who used comparable listed com-
panies in the same industry with most similar size and book-to-market ratio. Barber and
Lyon discussed three different reference benchmarks of identifying a control firm: match-
ing a treatment firm to a control firm with closest size (measured by the market value of
a firm), with closest book-to-market ratio, and with both similar size and book-to-market
ratio. They argued that filtering on size and then matching on the book-to-market ratio
yields test statistics that are well specified in all sampling situations that they analysed.
The procedure is described as follows.
Step 1. Identify the pre-event year of treatment firms. Pre-event year is the last clean year
before the violation year when the sanctioned RPT was taken place. For example, if
a treatment firm’s EA is against an undisclosed RPT initiated in 2012, then 2011 is
the pre-event year. The pre-event years of treatment firms cover from 1999 to 2012.
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Step 2. Select all available listed firms in each pre-event year. They shall issue A-share
stocks in mainland China and having complete financial data.
Step 3. In each year, group all the firms into 90 sub-industries of 19 major industries
following the Guidelines for the Industry Classification of Listed Companies issued
by the SRC in 2012.
Step 4. Within the industry match a treatment firm to a control firm with closest firm
size20 and book-to-market ratio21. Specifically, first identify the firms into a port-
folio with a size between 70% and 130% of the size of the treatment firm. Next
from the portfolio, choose the one with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of
the treatment firm.
Step 5. If no firm is distributed into portfolio (70%  130%), a firm with the closest
size is selected. If a matched firm coincidentally happens to be a treatment firm,
it is replaced with a firm from the same portfolio that has the next closest book-to-
market ratio.
Step 6. After firm matching is done, select comparable disclosures of RPT of a control
firm which are disclosed in an public announcement same as or close to the time
when the treatment firm should have disclosed its sanctioned RPT. If a treatment
firm’s violation time is 2012, an RPT with a close discolour timing in 2012 is se-
lected from the control firm.
An example is followed to illustrate the selection procedure of control firms. Dongfang
Energy Co., Ltd. (hereafter referred to as Dongfang Energy) is subject to an EA for the
undisclosed related trading taken place in 2012 (hence 2011 is the pre-event year). (1)
Extract all the A-share firms in 2011 from CSMAR database with information of industry
classification, firm size and book-to-market ratio. (2) Knowing Dongfang Energy is in
the electric and heat industry (industry code: D44), select all the firms with code D44 in
2011. (3) Calculate the figures equivalent to 70% and 130% of Dongfang Energy’s firm
size (RMB 2,485.44 million), which is RMB 1,739.81 million and RMB 3,231.08 million,
20Firm size is defined as the market value of the company which is equivalent to the sum of market value
of equity and book value of total liabilities.
21Book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of total assets divided by the firm’s market value.
43
respectively. (4) Within the portfolio of firms with code D44, select firms with firm size
between RMB 1,739.81 million and RMB 3,231.08 million. From this set of firms, choose
the one with the closest book-to-market ratio to that of Dongfang Energy (0.57). It turns
out that Binhai Energy & Development Co., Ltd. has the closest ratio 0.56, entitling it to
be the control firm that matches to the treatment firm Dongfang Energy. (5) Finally, select
all the comparable RPT disclosures of Binhai Energy & Development Co., Ltd. disclosed
in 2012.
With one treatment firm unpaired, 141 control firms with PAs are matched to 141 treat-
ment firms with EAs, one-to-one. However, there are 33 control firms that have no RPT
PAs and 13 are with missing stock data, leaving 117 RPT PAs of 95 firms in the sample
(see Table 2.
Table 2: Selection of Control Firms
This table presents the selection procedures for the sample of control firms. One treatment firm fails to be
matched. 141 firms listed on the SHSE and SZSE from 2000-2013 are matched to 141 treatment firms, one-
on-one, based on industry, size and book-to-market ratio. RPT with PAs undertaken by the control firms
and the initial PA date of the transaction are obtained from company’s online report. 33 firms are excluded
with no RPT PAs found. 13 firms lack of stock returns around the announcement date. Thus, 95 control
firms with 115 RPT PAs are remained in the preliminary control sample.
Panel A: Sample selection
PAs Firms
Total control firms - 141
Less firms with no PAs found - -33
Control firms with RPT PAs - 108
Less firms with insufficient stock returns - -13
Total 115 95
Panel B: Distribution of frequency
PAs Firms
Once 78 78
Twice in one year 12 6
Twice in two years 16 8
Three times in one year 3 1
Three times in two years 3 1
Three times in three years 3 1
Total 115 95
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4.1.3. Final sample
To achieve the purpose ofmatched-pair design andmake two samples are statistically com-
parable on one-to-one basis, only mutually matched firms are supposed to be included in
the final sample. After a second round of filtering, 34 treatment firms are removed as their
matched firms are absent from the sample of control firms; 11 control firms are removed
as their respective treatment firms have been eliminated due to insufficient stock data.
There are still 4 treatment firms that have more than one EAs since they are sanctioned
twice in two years. In order to be matched to the 84 PAs of control firms, 4 EAs released
in later years are removed from treatment firms. Finally, there are 84 RPT observations
of 84 firms in each sample making totally 168 observations in the final pool (see Table 3).
Table 3: Selection of Final Sample
This table presents the selection procedures for the treatment firms and control firms in the final sample. 34
treatment firms are removed as their matched firms are absent from the control sample. 11 control firms are
removed as their respective treatment firms have been eliminated due to insufficient stock data. 4 extra RPT
EAs of treatment firms are further removed. The final sample comprises 84 treatment firms and 84 control
firms.
Panel A: Sample selection
Treatment sample Control sample
Full samples 118 95
Less firms -34 -11
Final sample 84 84
Panel B: Distribution of frequency
Treatment observations Control observations
Once 80 84
Twice in two years 8 -
less observations -4 -
Final sample 84 84
Table 4 presents the distribution of firms across industries, and initial years of RPT over
time. The distribution is the same for both treatment firm and control firm because control
firms matches to the treatment firms based on industry and pre-event year (the year before
initial year).
Panel A of Table 4 shows the industry distribution of treatment firms by the CSRC ma-
jor industry division. Consistent with the pattern in this study, prior research has shown
similar industry concentration in manufacturing industry. In the research about identify-
ing RPT’s role in fraud cases, 83 SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcements in Henry
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Table 4: Distribution of Firms by Industry and Initial Year
This table reports the distribution of RPT by industry (panel A) and by initial fiscal year (panel B) during
2000-2013. The distribution of industry and initial fiscal year is identical for both treatment and control
samples of 84 listed firms, respectively. The industry category follows the one-digit CSRC industry classi-
fication.
Panel A: Firm industry
Industry Number Percentage (%)
Agriculture 3 3.6
Mining 2 2.4
Manufacturing 58 69.0
Power 4 4.8
Construction 1 1.2
Wholesale and Retail 4 4.8
Transportation 3 3.6
Information technology 2 2.4
Real estate 3 3.6
Leasing and Commercial service 1 1.2
Resident and Repair service 1 1.2
Others 2 2.4
Total 84 100.0
Panel B: Initial year of transactions
Year Number Percentage (%)
2000 1 1.2
2001 2 2.4
2002 2 2.4
2003 2 2.4
2005 1 1.2
2006 6 7.1
2007 5 6.0
2008 8 9.5
2009 11 13.1
2010 8 9.5
2011 16 19.0
2012 15 17.9
2013 7 8.3
Total 84 100.0
et al. (2007) showed an industry concentration both in manufacturing and business ser-
vices industry. Jian and Wong (2010) collected more than 5000 Chinese listed firms in
the period form 1998 to 2002, in which manufacturing industry accounts for a signifi-
cant proportion. The sample of Peng et al. (2011) comprised 787 firms listed in China
during 1998-2004 and also showed a similar concentration in the manufacturing industry.
Overall, the data suggests that the sample of this study is representative and the industry
distribution is comparable to the prior research.
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Panel B shows the distribution of RPT’s initial years over time. Since each transaction’s
duration is different ranging from several months to many years, only the starting point
could be portrayed across transactions. Panel B shows that the number of RPT has risen
since 2006 and peaks around 2011-2012.
Table 5 presents the data comparison for the selected financial statement items between
treatment and control firms. Financial data are obtained from the last clean financial state-
ment of the company in pre-event year. Since control firms are matched to treatment firms
on one-to-one basis, two samples of firms are supposed to share statistically similar finan-
cial characteristics. The statistical significance of the differences in these averages was
assessed using a two-tailed t-test (p-values are shown in parentheses). The p-values for the
mean difference of each item are large implying that there is a low probability of falsely
rejecting the true null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that the mean difference is small
between the treatment and control sample. Therefore, good matched pairs are believed to
be constructed.
Table 5: Comparison on Financial Profile for Treatment and Control Firms (RMB million)
This table presents the comparison on the descriptive statistics of financial characteristics for 168 firms listed
on the SHSE and SZSE during 2000-2013. Financial data are based on the last financial statements prior
to the transaction period and are obtained from CSMAR database. Revenue is the total operating revenue
which is the sum of all revenue arising from operating business of the company. Total asset is the sum of
all asset items. Total shareholders’ equity is the sum of all shareholders’ equity items. Size is the sum of
the market value of equity and the book value of total liabilities. The paired t-test is employed to test the
differences in mean. One-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. No statistically significant differences
for any item between two samples are reported.
n=84 Mean Std.Dev Min. 25 percentile Median 75 percentile Max. Mean difference
Revenues Treatment sample 2,376 4,957 33 417 1,070 2,235 38,414 -61
Control sample 2,437 5,257 1 493 813 1,908 30,289 (0.939)
Total Assets Treatment sample 3,486 5,811 88 959 1,558 2,962 28,953 -14
Control sample 3,500 6,059 305 884 1,482 2,624 28,725 (0.988)
Total Shareholders’ Equity Treatment sample 1,558 2,548 -698 451 900 1,348 15,851 -229
Control sample 1,787 2,861 51 524 840 1,553 12,656 (0.585)
Size Treatment sample 5,629 9,438 467 1,611 2,530 4,962 61,661 296
Control sample 5,333 9,386 380 1,551 2,542 4,664 50,269 (0.839)
For treatment firms, the revenues, total assets, and stockholders’ equity averaged RMB
2,376 million, RMB 3,486 million and RMB 1,558 million. However, these mean values
are skewed by some large companies in the sample. Whereas the median values are fairly
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comparable to those of prior results. The median values of the revenues, total assets, and
stockholders’ equity are RMB 1,070 million, RMB 1,558 million and RMB 900 million
(around $128 million, $186 million and $108 million). They are comparable to the median
values of financial statistics in the 1999-2006 RPT sample of Henry et al. (2012), where
the median values of the companies’ revenues, total assets, and stockholders’ equity are
$100 million, $84 million and $41 million, respectively. The median values of Henry et al.
(2012) are proportionally smaller since their sample size is 52, approximately two fifths
of the sample size of the current study with 84 firms.
4.2. MEASUREMENT OF MARKET REACTION
4.2.1. Event study
In this thesis the event study methodology is employed to test the impact of announcement
effect of RPT on the magnitude of abnormal stock performance around announcement
period. Event study is a successful empirical technique to date for isolating the price
impact of the information content of corporate actions (Kothari and Warner, 2007). It is
a useful tool to assess the extent to which security price performance at the time of an
event has been abnormal, that is, the extent to which security returns were different from
those which would have been appropriate (Brown and Warner, 1980). To construct an
event study, the event, event time, event window, estimation window and estimation model
should be determined, following the approach proposed by Brown and Warner (1980,
1985).
• The event conveys information that potentially influences the security prices. The
event defined for this study is the EA announcement issued by the regulatory insti-
tutions against an RPT for the treatment firm, and the PAs released by the control
firm to enter into an RPT. The former shows a sign that a firm is against the market
rule, and the latter indicates the firm is compliant the rule.
• An event time is the announcement date expressed as “0”. The announcement dates
of both RPT EAs and PAs in the sample do not overlap with other substantial events
(e.g., earnings announcement at the end of fiscal year) so that the confounding ef-
fects are excluded.
48
• An event window is a period over which the security prices of the firms involved in
this event will be examined, generally with the days preceding and succeeding the
announcement day. In this study three short event windows are used, which are [0
through +1], [-1 through +1], and [-5 through +5].
It has been empirically demonstrated that a short event window usually captures
the significant effect of an event (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). With a short event
window, one can be reasonably confident that an abnormal return is ascribed to an
event, because it is relatively easy to identify confounding effects. Moreover, due to
the concern that there is a leakage of information, some time prior to the announce-
ment of RPT (such as “-1” and “-5” in the event windows) is included to capture
abnormal returns associated with the leakage.
• An estimation window is a period over which parameters are estimated. Brown
and Warner (1985) used a maximum of 250 daily return observations for the period
around an event, starting at day -244 and ending at day +5 relative to the event. The
first 239 days in this period from the day -244 to the day -6 before the announcement
date 0 is designated the “estimation window”. For a security to be included in a
sample, it must have at least 30 daily returns in the entire 250 day period, and no
missing return data in the last 20 days. Fig. 1 shows the chronology of the event
study estimation.
• Three estimation models are used to estimate the abnormal return: mean adjusted
returns model, risk adjusted returns model and market adjusted model.
Figure 1: Timeline of Event Study
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4.2.2. Abnormal return measures
A security’s price performance can only be considered “abnormal” related to a particular
benchmark, which arises from the difference between the security’s actual ex post return
and its ex ante expected “normal” return. The ex ante expected “normal” return is usually
predicted under assumed pricing models (e.g., Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM)).
Abnormal returns are based on three models. Let Ri;t designates the observed arithmetic
return for security i at date t. Specifically, Ri;t represents the daily return with cash divi-
dend reinvested in A-share market in mainland China. Define ARi;T as the abnormal re-
turn for security i at date T. t is the day relative to the event time “0”, and 244  t  +5.
T only refers to the relative date constrained in the event window, and  5  T  +5.
The estimating procedures are as follows. The event window [-1,+1] is used to illustrate.
Step 1. Choose an estimation model to estimate the daily abnormal return ARi;T .
• Mean Adjusted Returns Model
ARi;T = Ri;T  Ri; (4.1)
where
Ri =
1
239
 6X
t= 244
Ri;t; (4.2)
and where Ri;t is the simple average daily returns of security i within the [-244,
-6] estimation window. The mean adjusted returns model assumes that the ex ante
expected return for a given security i is equal to a constant: E( eRi;T ) = Ri. Thus the
abnormal return ARi;T is given by the difference between the observed return, Ri;T
and the predicted return, Ri.
For ARi;T of a selected security i, there are three ARs for each day included in
the event window [-1,+1],
ARi; 1 = Ri; 1  Ri
ARi;0 = Ri;0  Ri
ARi;1 = Ri;1  Ri: (4.3)
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• Risk Adjusted Returns Model
ARi;T = Ri;T   a^i   ^iRm;T ; (4.4)
where a^i and ^i are the OLS estimates of the intercept and slope, respectively, of
the market model regression from the estimation window. This model takes risk
factors into account and presumes that the ex ante expected returns are generated
by the CAPM model developed by Black (1972): E( eRi;T ) = a^i + ^iRm;T , where
Rm;T is the return on the market portfolio. This study uses the equally weighted
daily aggregated market return from CSAMR as the proxy for Rm;t at day t.
Software STATA (Stata Statistical Software: STATA Corp., College Station, TX)
is used to produce a^i and ^i by regressing Ri;t on Rm;t for  244  t   6. For
example,
ARi; 1 = Ri; 1   a^i   ^iRm; 1
ARi;0 = Ri;0   a^i   ^iRm;0
ARi;1 = Ri;1   a^i   ^iRm;1: (4.5)
• Market Adjusted Returns Model
ARi;T = Ri;T  Rm;T ; (4.6)
where Rm;T is the same market index as that of equation 4.4. This model can be
viewed as a restricted market model with a^i = 0 and ^i = 1 for each security
(MacKinlay, 1997). Since the market portfolio is a linear combination of all secu-
rities in the market, it follows that for security i, E( eRi;t) = E( eRm;t) = Rm;t. The
estimation window is not necessary for this model since the parameters are prede-
fined. Thus the ex post abnormal return on any security i is equal to the difference
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between its return, Ri;t and that on the market portfolio, Rm;t. For example,
ARi; 1 = Ri; 1  Rm; 1
ARi;0 = Ri;0  Rm;0
ARi;1 = Ri;1  Rm;1: (4.7)
Step 2. Calculate CAR.
CARs for security i over an event window of days T1 through T2 are:
CARi;(T1;T2) =
T2X
T=T1
ARi;T : (4.8)
Accordingly, CARs of security i over the event window [-1,+1] are calculated as follows.
CARi;( 1;1) = ARi; 1 + ARi;0 + ARi;1
Average CARi;( 1;1) =
1
3
1X
T= 1
ARi;T : (4.9)
4.3. UNIVARIATE TESTS
The main motivation of this study is to address the research questions reflected in the
hypothesesH1a,H1b,H2a andH2b. It is of primary interest to investigate the abnormal re-
turns of firms with RPT EAs compared those of firms with RPT PAs. Particular attention
is put on the treatment sample (firms with RPT EAs) as to find whether CAR variations are
dependent on the inclusion of rectification actions, or on the engagement of non-operating
RPT.
The first univariate test is conducted on CARs of both treatment firms and control firms.
The mean difference is run using two-sample t-test. CARs results provided by the three
estimation models for three event windows are all included in the univariate test.
The second univariate test analyzes CARs of 37 treatment firms with rectification actions.
The value and significance are compared with CARs of the rest of treatment firms which
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did not announce rectification measures.
The third univariate test is also conducted for treatment firms. It aims to compare the
CARs of 32 treatment firms undertaking non-operating RPT to those of the treatment
firms undertaking other types of RPT.
It is expected that there are negative CARs for treatment firms (H1a), and positive CARs
for control firms (H1b). The CARs of treatment firms that have announced rectification
actions are less negative (H2a). The CARs of treatment firms undertaking non-operating
RPT are more negative (H2b).
4.4. MULTIVARIATE TESTS
Driven by the previous discussions, it is hypothesized that CARs can be characterized
as a joint function of announcement types, transaction types, corporate governance, and
control variables. Accordingly, based on the hypotheses to be examined, the following
general function is presented:
CAR = f(announcement types+ transaction types+ corporate governance
+ control variables) + error (4.10)
Regression models are built to get statistical inferences of correlations on announcement
types and transaction types. The presence of features of corporate governance is also seen
as possible explanations for the announcement effect of RPT measured by the magnitude
of abnormal returns.
4.4.1. Research variables
Dependent variables Brown and Warner (1985) in their study used simulation meth-
ods with actual data to address how OLS market model (also risk adjusted returns model
in current study) copes with a variety of issues arising from the particular characteristics
of daily stock returns. The OLS market model prevails under several circumstances, in-
cluding non-normality of returns and excess returns, bias parameters in the presence of
non-synchronous trading, autocorrelation in daily excess returns and event-date cluster-
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ing. They highly appreciated the OLS model that “there is no evidence that procedures
other than OLS improve either the specification or the power of the tests.”
MacKinlay (1997) also pointed out that the risk adjusted returns model is more precise
than other statistical models in calculating the abnormal return of a given security. There-
fore CARs which are estimated by the risk adjusted returns model for three different event
windows are used as dependent variables.
Announcement type According to the discussion in section 3.3.1, dummy variable Rec-
tification is used to proxy treatment firms with rectification measures embedded in the EA
announcements. It is predicted that the coefficient on Rectification is positive.
Transaction type In this study an RPT is classified into one of four below categories
on a case by case basis. Individual transaction is identified as either (1) operating, or (2)
non-operating activity. (3) Transactions who are described generally with regulatory rules
or whose nature cannot be traced are marked with “General” tag. (4) Transactions of a
company that comprise more than one type from the first three categories are tagged with
“Combine”. NOP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a treatment firm’s RPT is the non-
operating activity. OP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s RPT is the operating
activity. Same arrangements go for Combine and General. Higher negative correlation is
predicted between CARs and non-operating RPT.
Corporate governance and ownership variables To test H2c, two explanatory vari-
ables are considered representing the corporate governance: the CEO/chairman duality
(unitary leadership) and the board size. A board that has a CEO who is also the chair-
man is viewed as less independent and as a weaker monitor (Yermack, 1996; Brown and
Caylor, 2006; Henry et al., 2012). Smaller boards are believed to be more effective for
decision-making because having fewer people enhances the group’s collection, sharing
and processing of information (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Kohlbeck and
Mayhew, 2004). Whereas larger board size is also viewed as a positive sign for increased
auditing independence, low cost of debt financing and better performance in China (Klein,
2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Chen,
2014).
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The era of planned economy brought China many SOEs that are under tight control by
the government. Even though reforms have been carried out to transfer from state own-
ership to shareholding system the state still, directly or indirectly holds various level of
control over certain enterprises (especially sensitive industries, or politically motivated
enterprises) through central government, local government or a central holding company
known as SASAC (Clarke, 2003; Lin and Milhaupt, 2013). Zheng et al. (1998), Xu and
Wang (1997), and Bai et al. (2004) all investigated the impact of the state ownership on
enterprise performance. Based on the samples in China during 1986–1990, Zheng et al.
(1998) found that SOEs are less efficient than other ownership categories in terms of tech-
nical efficiency, which is measured as the ratio of observed output to output on the pro-
duction frontier. Xu and Wang (1997) argued that the state ownership is inefficient and
weakens the labor productivity. Bai et al. (2004) showed that state-controlled firms tend
to have lower valuation. Thus as a dummy variable indicating whether the company’s
ultimate controller is traced to the government, the ownership variable is predicted to be
negatively correlated with CARs.
It is predicted that the CARs be negative when the company’s ultimate controller is gov-
ernment (State) and the same person holds the position of chairman of the board and chief
executive (Dual). Since there are mixed views on the issue of board size and whether the
effect of board size on RPT is positive or negative has not be quite clear, the association
between boards size (B_Size) and the CARs remains unpredicted.
Control variables Return on assets (ROA) and the debt-to-equity ratio (Leverage) are
included in the regression model to control for firm performance. ROA indicates the
profitability of the firm before the transaction takes place. The leverage proxies for the
riskiness of debt or default risk (Dhaliwal et al., 1991). The higher the leverage, the higher
the default risk the firm has, and the lower the investors confidence might be.
The book-to-market ratio (BM) and firm size (Size) are also incorporated in the model
as control variables. Fama and French (1992) suggested that firm size, either proxied by
natural logarithm of book value of assets or market value of equity, offer a simple and
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powerful characterization of the cross-section of average stock returns, so does the book-
to-market ratio. Collins and Kothari (1989) implied that growth opportunities, which can
be measured by the market-to-book ratio, are likely to be positively associated with future
earnings levels and earnings persistence. Hence the higher the book-to-market ratio, the
lower the expected earnings growth and earnings persistence. In addition, book-to-market
ratio may also reflect the firm risk, which weakens the earnings-return association. The
year and industry fixed-effects are also controlled. There is no expectation on the signs of
control variables.
4.4.2. Descriptive summary
Summary statistics for the independent variables are provided in Table 6. Control firms
have slightly higher ROA than that of treatment firms, and have smaller leverage ratio,
both indicating that the treatment firms’ performance are lower. Nevertheless firms of two
samples are shown to have quite similar characteristics in terms of board size with 9 mem-
bers on average. Treatment firms are associated with a big portion of operating RPT (45%
versus 26%), and control firms engage in more non-operating transactions (67% versus
38%). CEO/chairman duality is much higher in treatment firms than in control firms (29%
versus 17%). Corporate ownership does not differ significantly between treatment firms
and control firms. Within the treatment sample, those which have announced rectification
actions account for 44%.
56
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of independent variables for the total sample and subsamples of
firms listed on the SHSE and SZSE during 2000-2013. Data of continuous variables are based on the last
financial statements prior to the transaction period and are obtained from CSMAR database. B_Size is the
number of board members. Size is the natural logarithm of the sum of of market value of equity and book
value of total liabilities. BM is book-to-market ratio. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. Leverage is
debt-to-equity ratio. OP is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has undertaken an operating transac-
tion. NOP is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has undertaken a non-operating transaction. Combine
is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has undertaken transactions with more than one type. Dual is
a dummy variable indicating that the same person holds the positions of CEO and chairman of the board.
State is a dummy variable indicating that the company’s ultimate controller is government. Rectification is
a dummy variable indicating the inclusion of rectification actions in an EA announcement.
Total sample Treatment sample Control sample
(n=168) (n=84) (n=84)
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Continuous variables
B_Size 9.113 9.000 9.083 9.000 9.143 9.000
Size 21.822 21.656 21.855 21.651 21.789 21.656
BM 0.652 0.653 0.642 0.664 0.662 0.641
ROA 0.036 0.046 0.030 0.046 0.042 0.050
Leverage 1.170 0.858 1.225 0.928 1.116 0.813
Discrete variables
Yes No Yes No Yes No
OP 60 108 38 46 22 62
(35.71%) (64.29%) (45.24%) (54.76%) (26.19%) (73.81%)
NOP 88 80 32 52 56 28
(52.38%) (47.62%) (38.10%) (61.90%) (66.67%) (33.33%)
Combine 6 162 6 78 0 84
(7.14%) (92.86%) (7.14%) (92.86%) (0.00%) (100.00%)
Dual 38 130 24 60 14 70
(22.62%) (77.38%) (28.57%) (71.43%) (16.67%) (83.33%)
State 82 86 40 44 42 42
(48.81%) (51.19%) (47.62%) (52.38%) (50.00%) (50.00%)
Rectification 37 47
(44.05%) (55.95%)
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables (sample size n=168)
This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix of independent variables for the total sample of 168 firms
listed on the SHSE and SZSE during 2000-2013. Treatment is a dummy variable indicating that the firm
belongs to the treatment sample (firm with RPT EAs). OP is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has
undertaken an operating transaction. NOP is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has undertaken a
non-operating transaction. Combine is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has undertaken transactions
with more than one type. Dual is a dummy variable indicating that the same person holds the positions of
CEO and chairman of the board. State is a dummy variable indicating that the company’s ultimate controller
is government. B_Size is the number of board members. Size is the natural logarithm of the sum of of market
value of equity and book value of total liabilities. BM is book-to-market ratio. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to
total assets. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. Rectification is a dummy variable indicating the inclusion of
rectification actions in an EA announcement. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
(1) Treatment 1.000
(2) OP 0.199*** 1.000
(3) NOP -0.286*** -0.782*** 1.000
(4) Combine 0.192** -0.143* -0.202*** 1.000
(5) Dual 0.142** -0.017 0.088 -0.104 1.000
(6) State -0.024 0.018 0.049 0.069 -0.186** 1.000
(7) B_Size -0.018 -0.067 0.029 0.085 -0.168** 0.246*** 1.000
(8) Size 0.035 -0.052 0.054 -0.106 -0.089 0.106 0.257*** 1.000
(9) BM -0.043 0.016 -0.042 0.156** 0.048 0.255*** 0.160** -0.080 1.000
(10) ROA -0.073 -0.109 0.096 -0.053 0.045 -0.068 0.127* 0.225*** -0.046 1.000
(11) Leverage 0.023 -0.085 0.060 0.143* 0.072 0.010 -0.036 0.050 0.157** -0.198*** 1.000
Table 7 reports the correlations between all the independent variables for the total sam-
ple. The dummy variables representing transaction types are significantly correlated to
the treatment firms. Dual is positively correlated with treatment firms as expected. It
is interesting to notice that there is a significant positive correlation between board size
(B_Size) and control variables (Size, BM, ROA). This implies that the number of board
member relates to the firm performance but does not suggest any causal relation.
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4.4.3. Empirical models
As explained in the prior paragraphs, the effects of selected determinants on the CARs of
a firm in the sample can be estimated by the following regression models:
CARi = 0 + 0Rectificationi
+1Sizei + 2BMi + 3ROAi + 4Leveragei
+YearFixedeffects+ IndustryFixedeffects+ "i (4.11)
CARi = 0 + 0Treatmenti + 1OPi + 2NOPi + 3Combinei
+4OPi  Treatment+ 5NOPi  Treatment+ 6Combinei  Treatment
+1ROAi + 2Leveragei
+ YearFixedeffects+ IndustryFixedeffects+ "i (4.12)
CARi = 0 + 0Treatmenti + 1Duali + 2Statei + 1B_Sizei
+3Duali  Treatment+ 4Statei  Treatment+ 5B_Sizei  Treatment
+2ROAi + 3Leveragei
+ YearFixedeffects+ IndustryFixedeffects+ "i (4.13)
CARi = 0 + 0Treatmenti + 1OPi + 2NOPi + 3Combinei
+4Duali + 5Statei + 1B_Sizei
+6OPi  Treatment+ 7NOPi  Treatment+ 8Combinei  Treatment
+9Duali  Treatment+ 10Statei  Treatment+ 11B_Sizei  Treatment
+2ROAi + 3Leveragei
+ YearFixedeffects+ IndustryFixedeffects+ "i (4.14)
where:
Treatment = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a treatment firm (firm with
RPT EAs), 0 otherwise;
OP = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s RPT is the operating activity,
0 otherwise;
NOP = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s RPT is the non-operating ac-
tivity, 0 otherwise;
Combine = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s RPT comprises more than one
type transactions (operating, non-operating or general), 0 otherwise;
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Rectification = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the RPT is announced with rectification
actions, 0 otherwise;
Dual = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman is also an executive of the
company, 0 otherwise;
State = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company’s ultimate controller is
government, 0 otherwise;
B_Size = the number of board members;
Size = natural logarithm of the sum of of market value of equity and book
value of total liabilities;
BM = the book-to-market ratio;
ROA = the ratio of EBIT to total assets;
Leverage = the debt-to-equity ratio.
Model 1 (equation 4.11) aims to detect how announcement types influence the CARs based
on the observed types of announcements among the treatment firms. Chen et al. (2005)
mentioned that punishment for firms which violate information disclosure regulations in-
cludes correcting the situation, internal criticism, public criticism in newspapers and on
websites, etc. The “correcting the situation” part refers to certain corrective actions (rec-
tification actions) such as replacing the auditor and the CEO in the personnel level, or
amending firm-level rules. It is expected that 0 > 0.
Since variables Size and BM are the criteria of the matched-pair design, they are simi-
lar for a treatment firm with its corresponding control firm. Therefore, they might not be
good controllers in the total sample and only used exclusively in Model 1. Hence Model
1 is only run on the treatment sample (sample size n=84). The remaining three models are
all run on the total sample (sample size n=168).
Model 2 (equation 4.12) compares the difference of CARs incurred by the different types
of transactions of treatment firms to that of control firms by adding interaction terms. It
is expected that 5 < 4 < 0.
Model 3 (equation 4.13) aims to capture the potential effect of the presence of certain
corporate governance features on the CARs. The interactions terms also examine the
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marginal difference incurred by the treatment firms. The choice of corporate governance
variables is affected by the previous studies on RPT (Gordon et al., 2006; Lei and Song,
2011; Henry et al., 2012). It is predicted that both coefficients of DualTreatment and
StateTreatment are negative: 3 < 0, 4 < 0. No prediction is made for the coefficient
on B_SizeTreatment.
Including all the independent variables and interaction terms, Model 4 (equation 4.14)
intends to test whether the captured effects from the former models will change in the full
equation.
This chapter discusses the sample collection and research design. The event studymethod-
ology constructs the theoretical foundation. Three specific estimation models are pre-
sented and illustrated to show how CARs for a security are calculated. Univariate analysis
is illustrated to test the main hypotheses of the study, followed by the multivariate models.
Next chapter reports the tests results.
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5. RESULTS
5.1. UNIVARIATE RESULTS
5.1.1. CARs comparison for treatment and control firms
If a company is sanctioned for RPT that has been undertaken against the accounting stan-
dards or information disclosure framework, it is expected that the market will react nega-
tively to reflect the loss of value related to expropriating activities. Likewise if a company
abides by the regulatory rules and discloses the RPT in PAs that has been scrutinized and
approved by regulatory institutions, the investors are assumed to show a positive expec-
tation that the disclosed RPT will have a favorable effect on company’s development.
Table 8 displays the average CARs relative to the announcement date for treatment firms
and control firms in three different window lengths [0,+1], [-1,+1] and [-5,+5], respec-
tively. Three methods are employed to compute CARs: mean adjusted returns model
(Panel A), risk adjusted returns model (Panel B) and market adjusted returns model (Panel
C). Parameters in the former two models are estimated with 239 daily stock returns from
the day -244 to the day -6 before the announcement date. The interpretation focuses on
risk adjusted abnormal returns in order to highlight the priority and save space. Results
based on the alternative approaches are qualitatively similar.
The finding is in line with the hypothesisH1a andH1b. Treatment firms with EAs earn sig-
nificantly negative abnormal returns in nearly all the windows while the control firms earn
significantly positively abnormal returns in all the windows. The p-values also indicate the
existence of significant difference in CARs between two samples. Specifically, CARs for
the treatment sample have the most significance over the shortest period in [0,+1] window
(-1%, p=0.004). Their significance decrease as the window lengths extend. This is similar
to the tendency detected by Lei and Song (2011) in which the CARs of CT with disclo-
sure exemptions are more negative and significant in event window [0,+1] than those in
[-5,+5]. It implies that the market responses rather rapidly to the negative news.
CARs of control sample, by contrast, are very significant in all three event window. It
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Table 8: Average CARs around Announcement Date for Treatment and Control Firms
This table reports the CARs in three event windows for 84 treatment firms and control firms listed on the
SHSE and SZSE during 2000-2013. CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal return. CARs are computed
using three models presented in three panels. Models are estimated by using 250 trading days of return data
ending 6 days before the announcement date. AD denotes the initial announcement date. The two-sample
t-test is employed to test the differences in mean. One-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Treatment sample Control sample Difference
Event windows (n=84) (n=84)
Panel A: Mean Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] -0.011*** 0.011** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.027) (0.0003)
[AD-1, AD+1] -0.012** 0.018*** 0.030***
(0.022) (0.006) (0.0002)
[AD-5, AD+5] -0.011 0.037*** 0.048***
(0.264) (0.001) (0.0006)
Panel B: Risk Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] -0.010*** 0.010*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.0001)
[AD-1, AD+1] -0.011*** 0.017*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.000) (0.0000)
[AD-5, AD+5] -0.012* 0.032*** 0.046***
(0.095) (0.000) (0.0000)
Panel C: Market Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] -0.009*** 0.010*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.0001)
[AD-1, AD+1] -0.010** 0.017*** 0.027***
(0.011) (0.001) (0.0000)
[AD-5, AD+5] -0.012* 0.027*** 0.039***
(0.071) (0.001) (0.0001)
become strongest over the longer period [-5,+5] (3.2%, p=0.000). The long-lasting posi-
tive response might be due to the strict disclosure requirement and the profound effect of
the large numbers of strategic transactions.
5.1.2. CARs comparison for treatment firms on announcement types
The relationship between CARs and rectification actions is important in addressing what
specific factors affect the market reaction to RPT EAs. Very few direct evidence is avail-
able for the discussion related to rectification or corrective actions. Only Feroz et al.
(1991) has provided indirect evidence that the sanctioned companies’ rectification actions
are helpful to weaken the negative market reaction. Therefore, it should be borne in mind
that it is unlikely that a package of rectification actions turns CARs from negative to be
positive overnight. What rectification actions play a part here is to gradually reduce the
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stock shock.
Table 9 reports the univariate results for treatment firms who announce rectification ac-
tions and who have not. There are 37 treatment firms whose RPT EAs include a rectifi-
cation announcement, and 47 treatment firms whose EAs did not include the implemen-
tation measures. For CARs calculated by the mean adjusted returns model, though not
significant, a trend of positive excess returns are demonstrated for firms with rectification
announcement, approximately ranging from 0.0% to 1.2%. For firms without rectification
announcement, CARs keep significantly negative around -2%.
Table 9: CAR Comparison for Treatment Firms With and Without Rectification Announcement
This table reports the CARs for 37 firms announcing rectification actions versus 47 firms not announcing
rectification actions in EAs. There are 84 treatment firms listed on the SHSE and SZSE during 2000-
2013. CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal return. CARs are computed using three models presented
in three panels. Models are estimated by using 250 trading days of return data ending 6 days before the
announcement date. AD denotes the initial announcement date. The two-sample t-test is employed to test
the differences in mean. One-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Rectification Without Rectification Difference
Event windows (n=37) (n=47)
Panel A: Mean Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] 0.000 -0.019*** 0.020***
(0.920) (0.001) (0.005)
[AD-1, AD+1] 0.001 -0.021*** 0.022**
(0.889) (0.005) (0.013)
[AD-5, AD+5] 0.012 -0.030** 0.042**
(0.319) (0.043) (0.017)
Panel B: Risk Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] -0.002 -0.016*** 0.015**
(0.677) (0.002) (0.015)
[AD-1, AD+1] -0.002 -0.018*** 0.016**
(0.764) (0.004) (0.024)
[AD-5, AD+5] -0.001 -0.021** 0.020*
(0.916) (0.027) (0.090)
Panel C: Market Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] -0.002 -0.014*** 0.013**
(0.671) (0.002) (0.022)
[AD-1, AD+1] -0.002 -0.016*** 0.014**
(0.719) (0.004) (0.031)
[AD-5, AD+5] -0.002 -0.021** 0.019*
(0.846) (0.028) (0.087)
CARs that are calculated by the rest of models are all negative but insignificant for firms
with rectification announcement. The negative average CARs are quite small and close
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to zero. CARs of firmswithout rectification announcement are all negative and significant.
The differences in mean CARs between two groups are significant indicating that rec-
tification actions do incur a change of abnormal returns. Therefore, the findings conform
to theH2a that market would react less negatively to the announcement of RPT EAs with
rectification actions than EAs without rectification.
5.1.3. CARs comparison for treatment firms on transaction types
The relationship between CARs and RPT types is another important research problem
to be addressed concerning the influential factors. In contrast to previous classification
methods of RPT (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004; Cheung et al., 2006; Henry et al., 2007;
Lei and Song, 2011), this study focuses on RPT that is not used for the prosperity of com-
pany’s main business operations.
Table 10 reports CARs for firms undertaking non-operating transactions versus firms
undertaking other types of RPT. Nearly all CARs calculated by three models in three
event windows show significantly negative values for treatment firms that undertake non-
operating transactions. The CARs approximately range from -1.4% to -2.8%. The longer
the window length, the more CARs become negative. In contrast, firms with other types
of RPT show CARs that are less negative and less significant. The differences between
two groups are mostly significant at 10% level.
There are 32 firms undertaking non-operating RPT which are fewer than the amount of
rest of firms (n=52). However, smaller sample still yields significant results, indicating
the confirmation of H2b that market would react more negatively to non-operating RPT
than to other types of RPT.
Overall, the univariate results meet the expectations of H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b. Market
reacts negatively to firms with RPT EAs, contrary to the firms with RPT PAs. Moreover,
investors react less negatively to EA announcements with rectification actions, whereas
more negatively to non-operating RPT with EAs.
65
Table 10: CAR Comparison for Treatment Firms With and Without Non-operating RPT
This table reports the CARs for 32 firms undertaking non-operating transactions versus 52 firms undertaking
other types of RPT. There are 84 treatment firms listed on the SHSE and SZSE during 2000-2013. CAR
denotes the cumulative abnormal return. CARs are computed using three models presented in three panels.
Models are estimated by using 250 trading days of return data ending 6 days before the announcement date.
AD denotes the initial announcement date. The two-sample t-test is employed to test the differences in
mean. One-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
NOP Other types Difference
Event windows (n=32) (n=52)
Panel A: Mean Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] -0.017*** -0.006 -0.011*
(0.010) (0.189) (0.087)
[AD-1, AD+1] -0.021** -0.006 -0.015*
(0.031) (0.293) (0.071)
[AD-5, AD+5] -0.028 -0.001 -0.027*
(0.123) (0.955) (0.089)
Panel B: Risk Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] -0.016*** -0.006 -0.009*
(0.002) (0.171) (0.094)
[AD-1, AD+1] -0.019*** -0.006 -0.013*
(0.004) (0.281) (0.066)
[AD-5, AD+5] -0.025** -0.004 -0.021*
(0.022) (0.653) (0.085)
Panel C: Market Adjusted Returns Model
[AD, AD+1] -0.014*** -0.006 -0.007
(0.001) (0.171) (0.139)
[AD-1, AD+1] -0.016*** -0.006 -0.010*
(0.002) (0.281) (0.091)
[AD-5, AD+5] -0.021** -0.004 -0.017
(0.036) (0.653) (0.128)
5.2. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Model 1 Table 11 presents the results of the regression Model 1 (equation 4.11) where
the CARs are positively influenced by the inclusion of the rectification action in the EA
announcement. The announcement of EAs can be released either by the CSRC, stock ex-
change, financial press or the company itself (Chen et al., 2005). When some companies
make the first disclosure of EA, they tend to propose the improvement measures that have
been done or yet to be done to rectify the violations. The rectification is expected to in-
crease the CARs. The regression is performed on the treatment sample.
As expected, the coefficient on Rectification is positive and significant in both [0,+1]
(0.015, p=0.053) and [-1,+1] (0.018, p=0.081). This suggests that when a company an-
nounces the rectification actions alongwith EAs, CARswill increase significantly by 1.5%
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Table 11: Regression of CARs on Announcement Types (sample size n=84)
This table reports the regression results of CARs in three event windows on the announcement type for
treatment sample estimated by Model 1 (equation 4.11). There are 84 treatment firms listed on the SHSE
and SZSE during 2000-2013. CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal return. CARs are computed using risk
adjusted returns model. Rectification is a dummy variable indicating the inclusion of rectification actions
in an EA announcement. Size is the natural logarithm of the sum of of market value of equity and book
value of total liabilities. BM is book-to-market ratio. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. Leverage is
debt-to-equity ratio. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Predicted sign CAR [0,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-5,+5]
Rectification + 0.015* 0.018* 0.020
(0.053) (0.081) (0.184)
Size ? 0.005 0.003 0.008
(0.198) (0.619) (0.266)
BM ? 0.032 0.030 0.025
(0.127) (0.253) (0.415)
ROA ? -0.033 -0.099*** -0.104*
(0.427) (0.007) (0.054)
Leverage ? -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.388) (0.375) (0.111)
Constant -0.118 -0.084 -0.257
(0.187) (0.510) (0.124)
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.046 -0.101 0.294
Robust F 10.900 1.910 171.960
to 1.8% within a short time. They become larger but less significant in [-5,+5]. Although
the coefficient on Rectification is not as significant as those in the other two windows
when the model has CAR [-5,+5] to be the dependent variable, the model does demon-
strate a good explanatory power with the value of the adjusted R square (0.294) and a
rather large F-statistic (171) in [-5,+5]. The positive coefficient on Rectification does not
conflict with the negative CARs in univariate tests, since CARs are the joint contribution
of both Rectification and other independent variables.
The significantly negative coefficient on ROA suggests that when the market learns that
the company is in sound financial condition priori to the RPT is undertaken, its reac-
tion toward the announcement decreases strongly since investors perceive the controlling
shareholder’ motive as for tunneling (Peng et al., 2011). The negative effect of Leverage
on CARs is not significant and very weak. It may be the case that the investors put less
intention on the debt structure or the variable is overwhelmed by other variables.
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Model 2 The regression results of the CARs on the transaction types are estimated by
Model 2 (equation 4.12) and are displayed in Table 12. This regression is performed to
examine whether investors differentiate the non-operating transactions from other types
of transactions facing that the companies are imposed by EAs. It is able to estimate the
correlation between CARs and different transaction types for control firms when Treat-
ment=0. By adding two interaction terms OPTreatment and NOPTreatment, it is also
able to estimate the marginal difference of CARs incurred by the treatment firms over
control firms (Treatment=1). The interaction variable CombineTreatment is omitted to
avoid multicollinearity. It is also omitted in Model 4.
Table 12: Regression of CARs on Transaction Types (sample size n=168)
This table reports the regression results of CARs in three event windows on the transaction types for the
total sample estimated by Model 2 (equation 4.12). Total sample contains 168 firms (84 treatment firms and
84 control firms) listed on the SHSE and SZSE during 2000-2013. CAR denotes the cumulative abnormal
return. CARs are computed using risk adjusted returns model. Treatment is a dummy variable indicating
that the firm belongs to the treatment sample (firm with RPT EAs). OP is a dummy variable indicating
that the firm has undertaken an operating transaction. NOP is a dummy variable indicating that the firm
has undertaken a non-operating transaction. Combine is a dummy variable indicating that the firm has
undertaken transactions with more than one type. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. Leverage is
debt-to-equity ratio. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Predicted sign CAR [0,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-5,+5]
Treatment   -0.004 -0.005 0.001
(0.786) (0.795) (0.960)
OP ? 0.017 0.019 0.025
(0.199) (0.263) (0.415)
NOP ? 0.011 0.021 0.015
(0.388) (0.261) (0.533)
Combine ? 0.017 0.026 0.019
(0.481) (0.378) (0.561)
OPTreatment   -0.016 -0.015 -0.047
(0.323) (0.476) (0.203)
NOPTreatment   -0.022 -0.032 -0.058*
(0.202) (0.177) (0.090)
ROA ? -0.000 -0.060* -0.092*
(0.995) (0.065) (0.070)
Leverage ? 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.723) (0.842) (0.249)
Constant -0.035 -0.026 0.019
(0.048) (0.379) (0.708)
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.061 0.072
Robust F 7.610 11.570 4.420
The coefficients on both interaction terms are negative and the one on NOPTreatment is
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more negative and more significant over period [-5,+5] (-0.058, p=0.090). It has two fold
implications. First, it means that CARs drop by 5.8% for a NOP which is undertaken by
the treatment firms compared with those of control firms. Second, it means that CARs are
much lower for a sanctioned NOP than those for a sanctioned OP, even though the pro-
portion of NOP is 38% within the treatment sample, less than that of OP (45%) (shown in
Table 6). Collected samples show that when a non-operating RPT is involved, it always
gives rise to the funds occupation by the controlling shareholder, so the market likely view
this type as a negative signal. This supports the conjecture that market reacts unfavorably
to the non-operating RPT as a way in facilitating the expropriation of minority sharehold-
ers’ interest. The results are consistent with the findings from Bertrand et al. (2002) and
Kang et al. (2014) that the non-operating RPT is typically viewed as a primary means of
tunneling.
It is worth noting that NOP and OP are significantly correlated with each other shown
in the correlation matric (Table 7), therefore, the multicollinearity must be checked on
NOP and OP. Using STATA, the VIF (variance inflation factor) value for NOP and OP is
7.76 and 8.20, respectively. The VIF values are smaller than 10, thus the multicollinear-
ity is eliminated. The regression results for the treatment firms with RPT EAs meet the
expectation of H2b.
Model 3 Table 13 reports the regression of CARs on proxies for the ownership structure
and corporate governance. Surprisingly the coefficient onDual differs from the preceding
speculation that the CARs are negative when the same person holds the position of chair-
man of the board and chief executive. The coefficients for Dual are 0.031 (p=0.015) in
[0,+1] and 0.030 (p=0.039) with high significance indicating that the control firms’ char-
acterisers of CEO duality contributes around 3% positive excess returns to their CARs.
It is not the first time that the speculation on CEO duality fails to be proved (Cheung et al.,
2006; Lei and Song, 2011). Lei and Song (2011) argued that the market noise may con-
taminate the market impact of CT announcements since in their sample there are many
small transactions and the direct effect of governance discount is relatively small. The
governance discount may be imposed by the market over a period of time when investors
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Table 13: Regression of CARs on Firm Characteristics (sample size n=168)
This table reports regression results of CARs in three event windows on the firm characteristics for the total
sample estimated by Model 3 (equation 4.13). Total sample contains 168 firms (84 treatment firms and 84
control firms) listed on the SHSE and SZSE during 2000-2013. CARs are computed using risk adjusted
returns model. CAR denotes cumulative abnormal return. Treatment is a dummy variable indicating that
the firm belongs to the treatment sample (firm with RPT EAs). Dual is a dummy variable indicating that the
same person holds the positions of CEO and chairman of the board. State is a dummy variable indicating
that the company’s ultimate controller is government. B_Size is the number of board members. ROA is the
ratio of EBIT to total assets. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Predicted sign CAR [0,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-5,+5]
Treatment   -0.015 -0.023 0.018
(0.660) (0.601) (0.818)
Dual   0.031** 0.030** 0.005
(0.015) (0.039) (0.822)
State   0.003 -0.003 -0.024
(0.741) (0.738) (0.241)
B_Size ? 0.002 -0.001 0.011***
(0.232) (0.764) (0.005)
DualTreatment   -0.032** -0.035* -0.018
(0.033) (0.056) (0.520)
StateTreatment   0.003 0.011 0.008
(0.765) (0.435) (0.748)
B_SizeTreatment ? 0.000 -0.000 -0.007
(0.961) (0.991) (0.435)
ROA ? -0.006 -0.057** -0.102**
(0.871) (0.028) (0.042)
Leverage ? 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.513) (0.526) (0.444)
Constant -0.032 0.005 -0.065
(0.035) (0.865) (0.188)
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.062 0.082
Robust F 10.340 10.690 4.460
start to perceive the poor corporate governance. However in the current study the opposite
sign is significant which eliminates the explanation given by Lei and Song (2011).
The results for CEO duality could be interpreted by the argument of Peng et al. (2007)
that the positive impact of CEO duality is likely to be profound for firms “confronting
problems associated with resource scarcity and environmental dynamism”. It conforms
to the control firms because most of them undertake RPT to facilitate resource allocation
strategically.
The coefficients for State is positive in [-1,+1] and [-5,+5] but not statistically signifi-
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cant. The coefficient on B_Size is significantly positive in [-5,+5] (0.011, p=0.005). It
implies that larger board size is viewed as a positive sign for better performance. This
finding backs up the larger board size effect and provides evidence on the previous rele-
vant debate.
The coefficient on the interaction term DualTreatment is -0.032 (p=0.033) in [0,+1] and
-0.035 (p=0.056) in [-1,+1] as predicted. The CARs drop by 3.2% to 3.5% when the treat-
ment firm’s CEO also acts as the chairman of the board. This finding does not collide with
the discovery of Peng et al. (2007) since they also stated that the effect of CEO duality
should be evaluated under contingencies predictions, rather being regarded as uniformly
good or bad. Since the RPT undertaken by the treatment firms involves disadvantageous
actions toward shareholders’ wealth and is concealed from the investors, CEO duality is
perceived as a weak monitor. Therefore, the significantly negative correlation between
treatment firm’s CARs and CEO duality is consistent with previous studies (Yermack,
1996; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Henry et al., 2012). The same interpretation is also fea-
sible on the negative coefficient on B_SizeTreatment. The coefficient on ROA remains
significantly negative. Therefore, the expectation of H2c is only plausible for treatment
firms with RPT EAs.
Model 4 Table 14 displays the regression results of CARs on all the independent vari-
ables as well as the interaction terms. The results further concrete the statistical correla-
tions on selected variables that are yielded from the preceding estimation models.
For treatment firms, the non-operating activities and the CEO/chairman duality have sig-
nificantly negative effect on CARs, respectively. For control firms, the board size and the
CEO/chairman duality have significantly positive correlations with CARs, respectively.
The former findings verify the hypotheses, and the latter findings extend the discovery of
the current study.
In this study, firms with EAs are differentiated from firms with PAs. Firms are also dif-
ferentiated with different types of transactions. In summary, the univariate and empirical
analysis show that (1) firms with RPT EAs are associated with negative and significantly
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Table 14: Regression of Full Model (sample size n=168)
This table reports the regression results of CARs in three event windows on all variables of transaction types
and firm characteristics for the total sample estimated by Model 4 (equation 4.14). CAR denotes the cumu-
lative abnormal return. CARs are computed using risk adjusted returns model. Total sample contains 168
firms (84 treatment firms and 84 control firms) listed on the SHSE and SZSE during 2000-2013. Treatment
is a dummy variable indicating that the firm belongs to the treatment sample (firm with RPT EAs). OP is a
dummy variable indicating that the firm has undertaken an operating transaction. NOP is a dummy variable
indicating that the firm has undertaken a non-operating transaction. Combine is a dummy variable indicating
that the firm has undertaken transactions with more than one type. Dual is a dummy variable indicating that
the same person holds the positions of CEO and chairman of the board. State is a dummy variable indicating
that the company’s ultimate controller is government. B_Size is the number of board members. ROA is the
ratio of EBIT to total assets. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Predicted sign CAR [0,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-5,+5]
Treatment   0.008 0.003 0.083
(0.815) (0.942) (0.311)
OP ? 0.017 0.016 0.042
(0.183) (0.343) (0.190)
NOP ? 0.004 0.013 0.021
(0.750) (0.468) (0.440)
Combine ? 0.010 0.021 0.016
(0.678) (0.494) (0.632)
Dual   0.033*** 0.030** 0.007
(0.009) (0.048) (0.758)
State   0.001 -0.005 -0.028
(0.888) (0.657) (0.193)
B_Size ? 0.002* -0.000 0.013***
(0.098) (0.920) (0.004)
OPTreatment   -0.020 -0.016 -0.064
(0.187) (0.439) (0.101)
NOPTreatment   -0.021 -0.030 -0.062*
(0.210) (0.200) (0.093)
DualTreatment   -0.030** -0.031* -0.013
(0.039) (0.100) (0.643)
StateTreatment   0.008 0.015 0.019
(0.488) (0.316) (0.511)
B_SizeTreatment ? -0.001 -0.001 -0.009
(0.764) (0.803) (0.276)
ROA ? -0.005 -0.062** -0.107**
(0.896) (0.041) (0.036)
Leverage ? 0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.686) (0.788) (0.317)
Constant -0.052 -0.010 -0.113
(0.005) (0.749) (0.061)
Year Fixed effects Ye Yes Yes
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.068 0.086
Robust F 6.180 9.260 5.170
lower CARs compared to the firms with RPT PAs, (2) the rectification action has a sig-
nificant effect to help the sanctioned firms to retrieve the investors’ confidence, and (3)
the CARs of firms with EAs are negatively associated with the non-operating transactions.
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Additionally, market differentiates the same characteristics of corporate governance based
on the degree to which the firm is compliance with the regulatory rules and laws. Plus, no
matter a firm’s RPT is sanctioned or legal, investors are less favorable to the RPT if the
firm is in a a priori good financial condition. In conclusion, H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b are
all strongly supported, and H2c is only valid for firms with EAs.
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6. CONCLUSION
Chinese Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 36 defines a related party transaction
(RPT) as an event whereby a transfer of resources, labor services or obligations takes place
between affiliated parties, irrespective of whether money is charged. China is suitable for
studying the inter-trading between related listed firms due to its characters of social en-
vironment. First, unique rules for share issuance and delisting stimulate companies to
engage in earnings management utilizing RPT. Second, the business group structure of
Chinese listed companies facilitates the implementation of RPT. Third, the weak legal
system is tolerant of RPT (Wong and Jian, 2003; Cheung et al., 2006; Chen and Chien,
2007; Jian and Wong, 2010; Lei and Song, 2011; Peng et al., 2011).
The data used in the research consists of 168 public firms listed in China from 2000-2013.
The main purpose of this study is to find how Chinese market reacts to the announcement
of enforcement actions (EAs) against listed companies’ RPT, therefore, is starts with a
sample of 84 firms with EAs. Meantime they are matched to the same number of firms
which have disclosed RPTwith public announcements (PAs) and not having been imposed
with EAs. EAs and companies’ financial statistics are obtained from China Stock Mar-
ket and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. PAs are obtained form the companies’
public reports.
The descriptive analysis of sample shows some interesting features of the Chinese public
companies which engage in RPT. RPT is largely concentrated in manufacturing industry
and is widely spread in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. In addition, there are average nine
members on board of a listed firm and the majority of them have separate CEO/chairman.
Debt is a primary financing method compared to equity financing in term of the leverage
ratio. Most of RPTs are undertaken for the company’s operation needs or at least cov-
ered by the operating activities. The state ownership is still the main ownership structure
denominated in China.
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6.1. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Five hypotheses are constructed on the basis of earlier studies. H1a aims to confirm the im-
pact of RPT EAs on the market reaction. It is hypothesizes that there is a negative market
reaction toward RPT EAs. Compared to H1a, H1b aims to confirm the announcement ef-
fects of RPT with PAs. It hypothesizes that there is a positive market reaction toward RPT
PAs. H2a attempts to investigate the impact of the rectification actions on the valuation
effects of firms with EAs. It assumes that the rectification actions have positive impact on
the market reaction. H2b explores the impact of transaction types on the market reaction.
And it assumes that the non-operating RPT raises negative market reaction. In order to
test H2b, RPT is mainly classified into two types, i.e., operating and non-operating. Ad-
ditionally,H2c intends to detect the market reaction toward firms with different corporate
governance mechanism with regards to the CEO duality, board size and ownership. The
sample of firms are divided into firm with EAs and firms with PAs.
This study offers four main findings to the extant literature.
First, market reacts significantly and negatively to EAs that are imposed on the listed
firms’ RPT. Firm that are subject to the RPT EAs lose value. The average cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) are approximately -0.9%  -1.2% fluctuating across different
announcement periods. Quite a few companies in the sample are sanctioned due tomissing
or false disclosure. Such misbehavior attempts to cover up transactions to conceal the pri-
vate benefit from the outside investors. It is injurious to investors’ interest and disfavored
consequentially yielding negative stock returns. By comparison, market reacts positively
and significantly to the RPT PAs. Their average CARs are around 1.0%  3.7% across
time. Investors believe that these publicly disclosed RPTs are good for a company’s nor-
mal operation hence having optimistic anticipation. Therefore, hypothesis H1a and H1b
are confirmed.
Second, the rectification actions are likely to be associated with the modest market re-
action. For firms that have not announced rectifications with EAs, their CARs are signif-
icantly negative with a magnitude ranging from -1.4% to as low as -3.0%. But for firms
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that have announced rectifications accompanying EAs, their CARs increase toward zero
(-0.1%  1.2%), thus the negative announcement effects are reduced. Therefore, H2a is
supported. Further, it is recommended for the sanctioned companies to publish the recti-
fication measures proactively and rapidly to retrieve the market rating.
Third, it is uncovered that even though few sanctioned RPTs are non-operating activi-
ties they have induced stronger market reaction than other types of transactions. For firms
that undertake non-operating RPT as the only transaction type sanctioned by EAs, market
shows negative and significant reactions. They yield CARs approximately around -1.4%
 -2.8%, whereas the remaining types of transactions yield CARs that are relatively less
negative and less significant. There are not many non-operating RPTs out of the total
amount of treatment sample (32 out of 84), but they still yield more significant abnormal
stock returns than the rest. H2b is confirmed.
Finally, it is found that market gives different evaluations on firms’ characteristics of cor-
porate governance based on whether RPT is sanctioned or not. For firms with RPT PAs,
the correlation between CARs and CEO duality is significantly positive (around 3.1%).
For firms with RPT EAs, however, market depreciates CEO duality by around 3.2% 
3.5%. Therefore, the hypothesis H2c is partially rejected since market does not discount
firms with RPT PAs. In addition, a positive association between CARs and board size is
reported. This is consistent with some researchers’ findings with respect to the effect of
board size on firms performance (Klein, 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Adams and Mehran,
2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Chen, 2014).
The study provides no support for the negative association between market reaction and
the government as the ultimate controller. An implication of this result is that recent years
the gap between SOEs and other ownership types of listed firms has been shrinking and
is gradually to be less of concern. An alternative possibility is that it might have been
affected by the sample size or the measurement of variable.
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6.2. CONTRIBUTIONS
The research findings of this study are expected not only to be bridged to the previous
research about RPT, but also shed new light on the field of announcement effect of EAs.
First of all, there have been massive studies concerning the valuation effects of normal
RPT announcements (e.g., Wong and Jian, 2003; Cheung et al., 2006; Kohlbeck and May-
hew, 2010; Lei and Song, 2011; Amzaleg and Barak, 2013), however, none of them bring
RPT with EAs into scope. There also have been studies about the valuation effects of EA
announcements released by regulatory institutions (e.g., Feroz et al., 1991; Chen et al.,
2005), but few of them focus on the EAs against RPT. This study fills in the gap by putting
the main emphasis on the announcement effect of RPT that is sanctioned with regulatory
body’s EAs. Using the Chinese stock data and RPT EAs observations, supporting results
are managed to be obtained confirming that market discounts the RPT EAs release signif-
icantly around announcement period.
The second contribution of this study is to consider the announcement type as one of the
factors that influence the market reaction for RPT EAs. The announcement type of EAs is
characterized as either including rectification measures or not. Some earlier studies only
have mentioned in passing the concept of rectification for auxiliary purpose (e.g., Feroz
et al., 1991; Firth et al., 2014). Considering the lack of evidence, I decided to expand the
discussion regarding whether and how the rectification actions affect the market reaction
toward EAs. The results provide valuable insight into the above question by showing that
the rectification actions mediate the negative stock shock incurred by RPT EAs.
The third contribution is to propose an argument that the non-operating RPT is more pos-
sible to be associated with the negative market reaction. The fund occupation resulted by
non-operating RPT is a very common but serious issue existing in the Chinese companies’
business activities (Zheng, 2006). However, there are a limited number of English articles
addressing this issue. When coming to the classification of RPT, most of studies choose
to differentiate transactions according to their trading forms (sale, purchase or lending,
etc) instead of ultimate purposes. Because these studies have normal or legal RPT in their
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research sample. EAs allow the study to learn an RPT’s real purpose that has been cov-
ered up in the previous disclosure before anything wrong is detected. Both univariate and
regression analyses end up with results supporting the argument.
6.3. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
This study has several practical implications for the listed companies, investors and regu-
lators. First, the company is advised to release the rectification actions as soon as possible
right after the EAs are issued. According to the univariate results, firms who also release
rectification measures have less negative stock returns than firms who do not release. This
can help to minimize the adverse effect on both company’s firm value and on sharehold-
ers’ interest.
Moreover, it is observed that a fraction of companies are sanctioned for improper exe-
cution, instead of for the expropriation. This is simply because the management is not
familiar with the related trading rules. For example, there are cases that the routine RPT
contracts are not signed, or trading amounts are exempted from reporting by mistake since
accountants are not aware of the specific exemption threshold. Therefore, themanagement
should put effort to enhance the occupational training, increase professional awareness and
improve the corporate governance.
Second, investors ought to be conscious of the potential exploitation by controlling share-
holders, or the potential revenue manipulation using RPT. This study has documented that
the announcement of RPT EAs results in a 1% statistically significant drop in the excess
stock returns on average. Thus investors consequently suffer wealth losses. Normally, re-
lated parties are listed in the footnote of annual report where the information of affiliated
relationship can be found. If there is evidence that a company keeps benefiting with, or
lending to a related party for years, it raises questions about the credibility of such trans-
actions. Investors are encouraged to increase their financial literacy.
Finally, regulators (such as the MOF, CSRC and stock exchanges) should strengthen the
law enforcement. Though Chinese stock market has grown rapidly in the past years, it has
been with weak legal and corporate governance structures (Chen et al., 2005). La Porta
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et al. (2000) argued that the law enforcement institutions play a vital role in safeguarding
the interests of investors and instilling confidence in the stock market. Therefore, on the
basis of thorough drafting of RPT standards, the regulation enforcement (such as more
severe punishments) is more urgent to be implemented. Furthermore, the CSRC should
increase the consistency and transparency of its investigations, giving a more comprehen-
sive disclosure of EAs. Borrowing and adopting the best regulatory practices from US or
other developed financial markets can also help the CSRC to improve its functions.
6.4. LIMITATIONS
Despite the valuable contributions to our existing knowledge about RPT, care must be
taken in generalizing this study’s findings.
First, only a small proportion of firms are included in the sample, which might lower
the statistical power of tests. Statistical power refers to the probability of rejecting the
null hypothesis, when the alternative hypothesis is correct (Cohen, 1988). It depends on
several factors including the sample size. Therefore, if the sample size declines, the statis-
tical power also declines, so does the power of reliably showing the traits that are sought
by the researcher.
Second, only the abnormal returns of short-term event windows are analyzed. This pre-
vents further analysis from inspecting the extent to which the announcement types, trans-
action types or other factors explain the magnitude of abnormal returns further. It is com-
monly recognized that an event window should be long enough to capture the significant
effect of the event, but short enough to exclude confounding effects (McWilliams and
Siegel, 1997). When the market adjustment to the new information of RPT is not immedi-
ate, or there is uncertainty about when the information was revealed, long event windows
might better to be used to capture the potential profound long-term effect.
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6.5. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are many options for the further research on the studies about RPT, such as explor-
ing various features of RPT EAs. The violation types could reveal a country’s common
company misbehavior, such as assets fabrication, false statement, failure to disclose infor-
mation, and shareholder embezzlement, etc. The report type seems to be rarely connected
with the topics of EA, such as interim report, quarterly report, temporary announcement,
or IPO prospectus. Another research option is the source of initial disclosure, such as the
company, stock exchange, regulatory agency, or social media.
This study arises several problems that required further exploration. For example, it is
worth to investigate that whether the attitude toward the CEO duality in current public
companies is always unfavored, or is dependent on the situation what a company is in,
such as the case that the CEO duality is more likely to be supported during a institutional
transition (Peng et al., 2007).
Given the importance of the RPT studies especially in China, more research about au-
diting on RPT is called for. EAs from the sample show that the constant on-going and the
complex mechanism of Chinese RPT need to be clearly aware by the auditing profession-
als. Other possible research problems include studying the practical implications of RPT
inside a company by adopting qualitative methods.
Finally, more precise and persuasive results are expected to be gained from high-caliber
quantitative methods. In sum, there are many interesting avenues for the future of RPT
research, in which the existing models of RPT effects should be extended and refined.
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APPENDIX A CSRC’s enforcement action on Hangzhou
Tian-mu-shan Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
The CSRC investigated Hangzhou Tian-mu-shan Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (hereafter re-
ferred to as Tianmu Pharmaceutical) and its lendings to companies which are controlled
by Pengfei Zhang who is Tianmu Pharmaceutical’s chairman of the board and controlling
shareholder. The lendings constitute the RPT and result in the funds possession by related
parties and capital loss. The CSRC enforcement actions against Tianmu Pharmaceutical
was published on 1 February 2009.
A.1 Facts of the violations
The core of the violation was the failure to adequately disclose the transactions between
the related parties.
• From 30 November to 1 December 2006, Tianmu Pharmaceutical provided “fian-
cial support” of RMB 40 million to its related party, Zhejiang Hyundai Automobile
Repair Co., Ltd. (hereafter referred to as Hyundai Automobile Repair) through sub-
sidiary. Tianmu Pharmaceutical first issued a check to one of its subsidiary located
in Zhejiang Province, and then the subsidiary endorsed the check over to Hyundai
Automobile Repair.
• During the period December 2006-March 2007, Tianmu Pharmaceutical again pro-
vided funds worth RMB 28.5 million to Hyundai Automobile Repair through bank
transfer and endorsement.
• In 2006, Tianmu Pharmaceutical signed an advertising agency contract with an ad-
vertising company (hereafter referred to as Agent) who was responsible for creating
an advertisement and having it run between 1 August 2006 to 31 December 2007.
In September 2006, Tianmu Pharmaceutical totally made advance payment of RMB
9.4 million to the Agent in three times after which the Agent transferred the funds
to Hyundai Automobile Repair.
• From December 2006 to January 2007 Tianmu Pharmaceutical transferred RMB 15
million in total to Hyundai Automobile Repair through a company whom Tianmu
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Pharmaceutical purchased packaging materials from.
FromDecember 2006 toApril 2007, TianmuPharmaceutical also transferred large amounts
of funds to another two related enterprises in the name of lending. All the RPTs were done
indirectly through a third party. All of the above related enterprise were controlled by
Tianmu Pharmaceutical’s chairman and controlling shareholder, Pengfei Zhang and the
frequent fund transfers were also known to and authorized by the CEO. No public disclo-
sure or announcement were made to the investors, which should have. Tianmu Pharma-
ceutical’s behavior was literally a tunnelling of minority shareholders’ wealth to benefit
the controlling shareholders.
A.2 Censure
Tianmu Pharmaceutical’s violations constituted behaviors of “failing to disclose infor-
mation in accordance with relevant regulations” according to Article 17722 (preceded by
Article 193) of Securities Laws based on which the CSRC decided to give warnings to
Tianmu Pharmaceutical, the chairman and the CEO, receptively; also imposed fines on
them of RMB 400,000, RMB 300,000 and RMB 30,000, respectively.
A.3 Classification
The RPTs were undertaken in the name of financial support or lending, and the essen-
tial purpose was to shift wealth to the controlling shareholder by expropriating minority
shareholders. Such transactions had no intention to be utilized into the company’s normal
operating activities or to improve the operating revenue. Therefore, the nature of the RPT
is classified as the non-operating activity.
22Article 177 of Securities Law: where the issuer of securities listed upon verification pursuant to this Law
fails to disclose information in accordance with relevant regulations or the information disclosed contains
a falsehood, misleading statement or major omission, the securities regulatory authority shall order the
issuer to take remedial measures and impose on it a fine of not less than 300,000 yuan but not more than
600,000 yuan. The persons directly in charge and the other persons directly responsible shall be given a
disciplinary warning and also be fined not less than 30,000 yuan but not more than 300,000 yuan. If the
offense constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to law.
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